**Aff answers**

**T/L**

**Orientalism is false**

**Attempts to label Orientalism as an effect of all powers takes away from the true origin – modern Europe, which used anthropocentrism, knowledge and liberalism to dominate nature to throw the world into modernity.**

**Hallaq 19** – He’s the Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University, where he has been teaching ethics, law, and political thought since 2009. He has published over eighty books and articles on topics including law, legal theory, philosophy, political theory, and logic. (Wael, “An Interview with Professor Wael Hallaq”, 3/4/19, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, http://www.fletcherforum.org/home/2019/2/12/an-interview-with-professor-wael-hallaq, Accessed 7/17/22)//mackerel

WH: To answer your question, I want to begin with the blurb’s statement that Restating Orientalism is concerned with “re-evaluating,” “deepening,” and “extending” the critique of Orientalism. Let me begin with the last of the trio, “extending,” but let me insert a caveat first. At one level, I could not even begin to extend Said’s critique when he, like almost every scholar engaged in such matters, applies the term indiscriminately, almost to any idea or person writing about anything Islamic, Asian or African. Said erroneously thought that Orientalists are to be found everywhere, from ancient Greece to thirteenth century Latin scholars, to von Grunebaum, Bernard Lewis and their likes in the twentieth century. So it is not true that I extend the critique in any of these directions. If anything, in fact, I limit its diachronic scope, I reign it in, and refuse to accept its sweeping historical coverage. **There was no Orientalism before modernity,** not even in the high cultures of antiquity who, according to Said, were also “racist.” […] I may even counter by deploying an equally categorical statement: “No matter how ethnocentric and how dominating pre-modern empires all were, **none could wed knowledge to power and redefine ethics as our modern empires did and continue to do.”**

But how do I extend the critique, which I in fact do? First, in order to show why it is a modern phenomenon, I deepen the exploration into the genealogy of modern knowledge in order to excavate a structure of thought that is – as a hegemonic structure -- unprecedented in human history. Second, because this structure is a foregrounding structure, it obviously did not just sit under the field of Orientalism alone. If the structure foregrounds modern thinking and ways of living in the world, then it radiates onto all disciplines, especially the ones formed by this structure as paradigms. This is the accurate meaning of “expanding the critique” in the blurb. I see engineering, economics, business schools, journalism, law schools, mainstream philosophy, science, medicine, and a host of others as being epistemologically structured in the same manner in which Orientalism was fashioned. The major difference, from this perspective, is the substantive content of each discipline. Orientalism is the most obvious field for the study of the other, even more so than anthropology, and it is here, in Orientalism, where **racism, manipulation, control, domination, and sovereignty** show themselves most obviously.

My argument, furthermore, is also that showing and practicing sovereignty over a Hindu or a Muslim in Asia is not very different from showing and exercising sovereignty over a tree or a river in the forests of Peru or Ecuador. I call each instance an epistemological “genetic slice” where the totality of such instances amounts to a unique but structured modern attitude toward the world. Said navigated at the political level of racism, pejorative language, and exoticizing the Orient, but could not see that what is involved in the production of Orientalism was nothing short of a deeper, underlying structure of thought from which he could not extricate his own thought.

**To critique Orientalism is to critique secular humanism, liberalism, anthropocentrism, materialism, capitalism** -- all of which, and more, Said took for granted.

FF: What is the relationship between ‘the west’, modernity, knowledge and power? Could you elaborate on the relationship between orientalism and colonialism?

WH: I think it is important to understand that modernity is not a continuous trajectory with what preceded it. Modernization theory continues unabated in almost every academic field. This theory, foundational to writing and making history, operates on the assumption of what I have labelled a “theology of progress.” The theology is founded on the assumption that time has a homogeneous teleological structure, that this structure is inevitable, and that the earliest phases of history were preparatory for the later ones, which were in turn simply the means to reach the intended summit of real human progress: Western modernity. Integral to this understanding is that no culture or “civilization” outside of and prior to modern Europe possessed the same validity, competence, and moral and intellectual development. Whatever these civilizations had possessed of value, culturally or otherwise, was consumed in the process of preparing for a higher goal, outside and beyond themselves. The goal was Western modernity, which was imposed on the world by colonialism, coercion, and hegemony.

Even if we were to concede—however objectionable and repugnant this may be— that modernity’s violent tools were adopted by necessity with a view to improving the human condition, we find ourselves facing the bitter reality of a world in which we have destroyed almost everything around us, from communal and social structures to ecology and environment.

What many do not seem to understand is that all this is integral to modernity as a particular project, as a particular epistemology which has dictated a particular set of practices, all of which are the work of a particular subject, a particular subjectivity. My argument is that modernity’s structure of thought created a novel relationship between man and nature, one that produced a pathological sense of domination over nature, including our own.

Colonialism did not start in the colonies, but in Europe itself, and this is because early modern Europe embarked on a quest in which **knowledge was systematically harnessed to subjugate nature, including our own selves.** **Orientalism is nothing more than a strand of discourse by which this bleak result was achieved, but every branch of knowledge** – philosophy, science, law, etc.– **is equally involved** in the same project. That modernity now is everywhere in the world should not hide the fact of its European origins. The reader is advised to read the book for a detailed account of how all this happened.

**Orientalism is only regarded as dangerous by those who don’t know enough about it, Said’s book is riddled with vengeful bias, and the theory provides incentives for not considering Asian scholarship.**

**Owen 12** [Owen, Roger, Roger Owen is the A.J. Meyer Professor of Middle East History at Harvard University and was previously the Director of the university’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies., 4-20-2012, "Edward Said and the Two Critiques of Orientalism," Middle East Institute, https://www.mei.edu/publications/edward-said-and-two-critiques-orientalism]//AA

And so it has been ever since. **Orientalism** often continues to be regarded as **dangerous**, perhaps in particular by those who have **never** read it. Hence, the intense, ludicrous, alarming and, I would hope, unique way in which the field of modern Middle Eastern studies has become polarized between the followers of Edward Said and those of Bernard Lewis and, now between those belonging to the Middle East Studies Association (MESA) and its newly-created rival, the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa (ASMEA). Given the fact that this **“dangerous person”** Edward Said appeared well-versed, if not in the social sciences then in post-structuralism and in what was soon to become post-colonial studies, meant that the motley band of persons identified as Saidians could all be tarred — regardless of what they actually said, regardless of what they actually taught — with the same brush as being purveyors of politically motivated, trendy, and **ideologically dangerous gibberish**. Such is the **meretricious** message which, **without** much **elaboration**, and without any obvious mental effort, remains as **potent** with some audiences as it did 30 years ago. It also is worth noting that the **personal tone** of the book helped to make things even worse. The author himself, his reasons for writing the book, his **genuine offense** at the way Arabs and Muslim are objectified in such a **reductionist** way, is powerfully present in the text. He names names — Bernard Lewis’ in particular. And certain passages are more easily read as political and polemical rather than as scholarly and academic, even if this was almost certainly not Edward’s original intention. All this has had unfortunate consequences. Critics use the personal and the political to muddy the waters, not only of Edward’s critique itself but also of anyone who can reasonably, or unreasonably, be associated with it. Hence it provides a reason for **not** taking the work of a huge number of scholars of the Middle East with the academic respect it deserves, even when, as in the case of most social scientists at least, their work has little or **nothing** to do with **Orientalism**, either in praise or blame. By the same token, it allows those who still practice some version of an Orientalist approach to **insulate** themselves, and their students, from a powerful, alternative, point of view. More seriously, the ad hominem attacks on Said and his band of alleged Pied Pipers also make it more difficult to sustain an attack on the role of Orientalists in authorizing certain aspects not only of American military and security policy but those of Israel as well. For all the books that castigate the malign influence of the State Department Arabists, none to my knowledge point to the policy impact of Israeli Orientalists as well as to the fact that, even in Israeli terms, their close association with the country’s defense establishment has been counter-productive to what might be described as the country’s national interests. Think of expert authorities like Gabriel Baer, who assured me, in the mid-1970s, that Egypt would never make peace with Israel. Think of those who created and managed the Palestinian “village leagues.” Think of those who supported policies to encourage Hamas during the first Intifada. Think of those who argued that the Shi‘a population could be lured into playing an anti-PLO, anti-Syrian role in South Lebanon. Bad Orientalism **encourages** the notion that the **enemy** of my **enemy** is my **friend**. Bad Orientalism, paradoxically, though based on the concept of a certain Middle Eastern timelessness, authorizes ambitious schemes of political and social engineering based on **short-term** considerations while **lacking** any way of **anticipating** unexpected long-term **consequences**.

**Rejecting modernity is wrong – we must develop an external critique that emphasizes ethics to displace the central domains that make up modern civilization**

**Hallaq 19** – He’s the Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University, where he has been teaching ethics, law, and political thought since 2009. He has published over eighty books and articles on topics including law, legal theory, philosophy, political theory, and logic. (Wael, “An Interview with Professor Wael Hallaq”, 3/4/19, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, http://www.fletcherforum.org/home/2019/2/12/an-interview-with-professor-wael-hallaq, Accessed 7/17/22)//mackerel

WH: My short answer is a resounding Yes. I think that the position which argues that one cannot critique modernity from within modernity—necessarily the only place in which we find ourselves— is a nihilistic one. It is both historically and epistemologically untenable. Historically, because every piece of evidence points to the undeniable fact that systems and cultures and “civilizations” are not only in constant change, but they come and go. Modernity came at the heel of European Christendom, just as Islam came at the heel of Persian and Byzantine empires, and Greece before it displaced Pharaonic Egypt and Phoenicia. Each one of these “civilizational constellations” was epistemologically and culturally unique, each with a particular way of seeing the world. **To say that modernity is the end of history is sheer foolishness.** Epistemologically, because our forms of knowledge have done us a great deal of disservice. To say the least, we have destroyed the very Earth we live on, our home, and this is because we no longer know who we are.

So the question is how do we go about exiting this situation? In Restating Orientalism and [my] new book to appear next year, Reforming Modernity , I argue that our only hope is to develop what I call an **external critique**, which **does not mean that we can speak from outside modernity.** To speak from within modernity is inescapable. In my earlier The Impossible State, I developed the concept of central and peripheral domains, both of which must exist in all cultures and “civilizations.” For example, in modernity, the state, capitalism, bureaucracy, and a particular form of reason have become central domains that govern all other domains. These central domains have formed our subjectivities, and made us who we are. My argument is that we can capitalize on the peripheral domains, through an act of heuristic retrieval, in order to displace the central domains. And ethics is one peripheral domain from which we can begin to rethink who we are. In the time and space we have here, I cannot of course tell you what the details and modalities of this project are, but the three works I have referred to above begin this continuing project.

**Orientalism is a flawed and contradictory theory**

**Landlow 7**[(George P Landlow, Oct 23 2007, "Edward W. Said's Orientalism," Professor of English and Art History, Brown University, http://www.postcolonialweb.org/poldiscourse/said/orient14.html)**//BRownRice**](file:///C:\Users\rishishetty\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Word\(George%20P%20Landlow,%20Oct%2023%202007,%20%22Edward%20W.%20Said's%20Orientalism,%22%20Professor%20of%20English%20and%20Art%20History,%20Brown%20University,%20http:\www.postcolonialweb.org\poldiscourse\said\orient14.html)\BRownRice)

Drawing upon the methods of feminist criticism of the 1970s, Said's Orientalism did much to create the field of postcolonial studies by teaching us to "read for the gap," placing texts in broad political contexts. Despite its obviously valid points about weaknesses of Euro-American thought, its appeal for Western intellectuals, and its liberating effect on intellectuals from former countries that were colonized, this seminal book has some major flaws: Though enormously effective as a polemic, Orientalism is very shoddy as scholarship, and yet it presents itself as a corrective to flawed scholarship. The book completely neglects China, Japan, and South East Asia, and it has very little to say about India. Although purporting to be a study of how the West treats all of the East, the book focuses almost entirely upon the Middle East. Its generalizations about "the Orient" therefore repeat the very Orientalism it attacks in other texts! It is bizarrely forgiving of French Orientalist writers like Nerval and Flaubert. Orientalism is an orientalist text several times over, and in two ways commits the major errors involved with the idea of the Other: First, it assumes that such projection and its harmful political consequences are something that only the West does to the East rather than something all societies do to one another. (I am surely not the only teacher who has had heard Asian-American students returning from their parent's country of origin exclaim, "Everything Said says the West does to the East, the East does to the West!") Because Orientalism is apparently based on very little knowledge of the history of European and Non-European imperialism, it treats Western colonialism as unique. This point, like the previous one, makes perfect sense if one takes Said's pioneering book largely as a political polemic, for in that case such omissions might be forgivable. One expects more from criticism and scholarship, particularly politically motivated criticism and scholarship. Although greatly influenced by feminist criticism and theory, Orientalism almost completely neglects gender matters. Although emphasizing the way the West sexualizes the East, it also tends to repeat the pattern, and, moreover, its generally favorable treatment of French orientalization suggests a great insensitivity to such issues, For many scholars, one of Orientalism's most offensive claims was its dramatic assertion that no European or American scholar could "know" the Orient and that, moreover, all scholarly attempts to do so (except Said's own) always constituted acts of oppression. In a single dramatic move, which had great appeal for many, Said committed the greatest single scholarly sin: he silenced others by preventing them from taking part in the debate. According to Said, if someone knew Persian or Tamil grammar, the history of Islam or Hinduism, or the societies of Saudi Arabia, Eygpt, or Bangladesh, he or she already belonged to the devil's party. They were corrupted by what Said defined as Orientalism. For Said, who studied literature at Princeton and Harvard, this proved a very convenient tactic, since he knew very little about these alien fields. Indeed, one of the bitterest charges directed at him was that in his own Orientalist ignorance of the actual Middle East, Said himself in effect suppressed important work by Egyptian and Arabic scholars! Whatever liberatory or other benefits Orientalism might have offered upon its appearance, it has harmed literary studies and literary students. By focusing exclusively on the political valences of literary texts, it has very little to offer those also interested their literary or aesthetic dimensions. Even those with little interest in such non-political themes have been harmed by the school of thought Orientalism has fostered: its political argument, which first enriched familiar texts, impoverishes when it leads to a neglect of literary and rhetorical technique. (Note: Said does not himself argue against acquiring such skills, but those who follow him often do.) Even if all these charges were true (and I believe they are), Said's Orientalism remains a major work. Why do you think this is the case? How is the book larger than the local conditions in which it was produced? Why do the book's strengths, rather than its weaknesses, appear far more important to a scholar working in, say, Morocco, Singapore, or India?

**Orientalism is a myth that perpetuates the rhetoric that people of the east are barbarians that must me colonized and corrected for the good of the world-it legitimizes violence and gathers public support for it**

Joanne **Esch 10**[Joanne Esch, Ph.D. candidate who specializes in organizational communication and communication practices of law and policy at the university of Boulder Colorado, "Legitimizing the "War on Terror": Political Myth in Official-Level Rhetoric on JSTOR", June 2010, Political Psychology Vol. 31, No. 3, International Society of Political Psychology, https://www-jstor-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/stable/20721298?sid=primo, 1LEE]

The **myth of Civilization v. Barbarism** (also known as the "new barbarism thesis"--see Richards, 1996) and its variations **are an outgrowth of** the third aspect of the myth of **American Exceptionalism**: America represents the forces of good against evil**. This myth is a classic story of "Us versus Them"** that favors cultural or civilizational explanations for conflict over political or economic ones. The myth's central dichotomy **appeals to identity and makes it powerfully intuitive.** Linguists and anthropologists have noted that language has a binary structure wherein almost every noun, adjective, and verb has a direct opposite. Generally, one term has positive connotations while the other does not, and using one term brings to mind its value-opposite. This underlying architecture of **language is relevant** to the study of this myth, **because it means that** either word--**civilization or barbarism**--**alone can conjure the larger body of work on myth**. If a speaker talks about the "triumph of civilization," it can be understood that (good) civilization is triumphing over (bad) barbarians (Jackson, 2005). Thus, words that have clear opposites--for example, justice, western, evil, freedom, and hate--**are especially powerful lexical triggers of political myth.** According to Cap (2005),

The present formula of social communication in the US demonstrates a striking proportion of language which portrays reality in terms of a necessary division into "two," which the latter usually means different and opposing. Such a stance is hence expected of politicians, and non compliance is scarcely tolerated--President Bill Clinton ... got under a massive wave of criticism for being "too conciliatory" in his 1997 State of the Union Address, (p. 14)

This sheds light on the groundwork and intuitive appeal of Civilization v. Barbar ism. Huntington's 1993 thesis, The Clash of Civilizations, and Barber's (1992) Jihad vs. McWorld are reified traces of work on this myth. **Today, Civilization v. Barbarism acts as a classic story of "Us versus Them**," in which a **politically and culturally civilized western world is defined in opposition to a violent and barbaric eastern world**. Edward **Said** (1978) drew attention to this construct in his famous book, **Orientalism**. The lasting influence of Rafael Patai's (1973) book The Arab Mind is an especially relevant example of (neo-)Orientalism. Patai claimed that **psychological and cultural factors intrinsic to the "Arab mind" account for what he described as the violence, stagnation, and backwardness of Arab populations**. Such (neo-)Orientalist explanations for violence have **served as a sort of pseudo scientific alibi for the Civilization v. Barbarism myth**, illustrating the sometimes porous boundary between myth and scientific theory.

Certainly, **rhetoric of the time accessed this myth in order to legitimize and justify acts of genocide** against Native Americans throughout the eighteenth century. In fact, William McKinley's secretary of state, John Hay, combined the third com ponent of American Exceptionalism with Civilization v. Barbarism when he described the Indian wars as "the righteous victory of light over darkness ... the fight of civilization against barbarism" (qtd. in Judis, 2005, p. 55). **Cold War rhetoric also conveyed the myth of Civilization v. Barbarism, and Reagan's rheto ric in particular used the language of "good versus evil**." As the discourse and practice of the Cold War reveals, the significance of the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union went far beyond politics and economics; it was understood that a Godless "**evil empire" was threatening our way of life.** Implicit in the Nixon-Khrushchev Kitchen Debate was the idea that the encroachment of the Soviet Union would threaten the commodity-rich lifestyles of average Ameri cans. The discourse around the threat of Communism was largely an exercise in axiological proximization, whereby the evil ideology of the enemy was conveyed as encroaching on everything we know to be good and right. Because of the ideological nature of the Cold War, We and They could not be reliably defined by geopolitical borders; so **the myth of Civilization v. Barbarism served as a discursive compensation for blurred boundaries.**

George H.W. Bush's public opinion polls and focus groups showed that the **public found rhetoric emphasizing axiological considerations such as the "evil" deeds of Saddam Hussein to be more compelling** in justifying the Gulf War than rhetoric emphasizing economic reasons, such as jobs and oil (Rottinghaus, 2008). Thus, **the legitimization effect of "good versus evil" rhetoric is widely acknowledged.**

**Orientalism isn’t that great of a book**

**Bijl 22** – Freelance writer/analyst interested in Sino-African and Afrasian relations (Matthijs, “The Remaking of Edward Saïd’s Orientalism”, 3/3/22, Medium, <https://medium.com/@matthijsbijl/the-remaking-of-edward-saids-orientalism-no-postcolonial-critique-c5ea78d232c8>, Accessed 7/16/22)//mackerel

Orientalism is and was known as a controversial work. I can’t comment on scholarly criticism with regard to Saïd’s inferences made from 18th/19th and 20th-century writers, which may or may not sometimes have been incorrectly interpreted or cited. Regardless, there was undeniably some sort of representation constructed and reproduced in literature and by policymakers that had clear racist undertones and was embedded in a strong sense of Western superiority. There are several issues with Orientalism, however, beginning with Saïd’s **problematic understanding of representations**. The Self vs. Other concept is pretty straightforward, namely that along the passage of time and increasing contacts with and knowledge of other peoples, human societies have felt the need to define themselves in opposition to a fictional Other. This has become a Manichean relationship in which the Self is dependent in its own construction on its representation of the Other. For example, ‘we are civilized because they are barbaric’ or ‘we are good because they are evil’. Saïd criticizes Orientalism as a discourse that has inadequately represented the Orient and thereby constructed and reaffirmed the high notions Western cultures had/have about themselves. In itself, this argument is well-grounded in a review of centuries of Western colonial literature, conquests, and political/economic domination. But Saïd isn’t necessarily concerned with the problems of colonialism. As stated by himself: The Arab world today is an intellectual, political, and cultural satellite of the United States. This is not in itself something to be lamented; the specific form of the satellite relationship, however, is. Saïd’s overriding concern is with an incorrect, and therefore unjust, representation of this Arab world. He decries the “degradation of knowledge” and implores his readers to accept that their conception of the Middle East/Orient is distorted by constructed representations. He urges them to expand their knowledge in order to decrease (and perhaps **ultimately break** out of) this distortion of knowledge. What he is, seemingly, not concerned with is: (1) how a changing cultural representation of the Orient Other would necessarily impact the representation of the Western Self; (2) how the Orient has represented itself vis-à-vis the West; Saïd claims there is a clear imbalance in the number of works produced in the West on the Orient versus the number of workers produced in the Orient on the West, and one cannot really speak of a self-representation or at the very least a counterweight in that regard; (3) the question whether some sort of representation is inevitable. In the theoretical case a representation of the Other would be entirely ‘native’ and just, would an Other still exist? And would You as a Self continue to exist? As Saïd himself touches upon, an arbitrary division has been made on a variety of artificial categories such as race, which has led to the removal of the universality of humanity. By returning to a state of universal humanity, the fabric of societies might be argued to unravel. People have cared beyond their own family about their community precisely because they have been able to identify with it and in opposition to others. While an understanding of other cultures is necessary and essential, some sort of representation to fit these cultures within one’s own framework appears necessary in order to continue human societies as we know them. Without a Self vs. Other cultural representation, humanity would in its universality return to a family clan-based organization. Or, in other words, it would continue a Self vs. Other representation but now simply based on bloodlines. Orientalism, moreover, boils down to the dictum power is knowledge. This is not unique to Western representations of the Orient, of course, and would extend to every historic relationship in which one culture has exercised political and economic hegemony over another and thereby repurposed representations of the other culture. Saïd merely touches upon this broad application of his critique on cultural representations, failing to see the broader implications and applications of his writing. After all, Orientalism addresses a small circle of academic readers who, for example, are assumed by Saïd to be already well-versed in etymological discussions of the Arabic word tahwra. Saïd’s main goal, in the end, appears to be the awakening of Orientalists who fail to see that their body of knowledge on the Orient is **constructed rather than an accurate representation**. He is writing for an Occidental audience who can read vast quotations in French and have intimate knowledge of obscure Orientalists. He is not interested in any Oriental readers. Saïd published his work in English and didn’t author its later Arabic translation. He also makes no reference to Oriental representations of itself and the Occident, and ways in which they might have been constituent for Orientalism itself. The adoption of Orientalism as a postcolonial critique is therefore **clearly a remaking and incorrect representation** of Saïd’s personal and academic intentions and his writing. Saïd is not out to tilt the balance of power in favor of the colonized, **he merely intends to make the colonizer understand his colonized object better.** He explains how through philology, in combination with other disciplines, representations of the Other/Orient were imbued by racism. Yet for all his detailed descriptions of the clear racism and exploitation of the Orient by the West, Orientalism is no scathing critique of racism, colonialism, or imperialism. Following the publication and subsequent popularity of his work, Saïd and his readers have remade his work to represent such a critique. Note for example the most popular quote of the book on Goodreads: “Every single empire in its official discourse has said that it is not like all the others, that its circumstances are special, that it has a mission to enlighten, civilize, bring order and democracy, and that it uses force only as a last resort. And, sadder still, there always is a chorus of willing intellectuals to say calming words about benign or altruistic empires, as if one shouldn’t trust the evidence of one’s eyes watching the destruction and the misery and death brought by the latest mission civilizatrice.” This quote isn’t from the original edition of Orientalism published in 1978 but is penned down by Saïd in his preface to the 25th-anniversary edition, in 2003. Its anti-imperial/colonial tone is something Saïd actively eschewed in his original work. One can only speculate to the reason (fear of reputation damage in an already close-knit community of academics? Failure to escape from his own Western education?), but it is clear that by 2003 Saïd had remade himself into an advocate of postcolonialism and critic of the West (although he rejects the notion still in 2003 that his book is anti-West). But besides Saïd himself, who now is even considered “a founder of postcolonialism”, Orientalism has been remade by its readers as well into a postcolonial critique. Through the fact it has been simplified and reduced to a mere few sentences in academic teaching, but also through its readers who were especially offended or inspired by its slimmer of revolt against and renunciation of the West and reframed the book in turn through the emotions evoked. If anything, this remaking of Orientalism itself is a vivid display of the way in which a search for scientific objectivity and an uncovering of “truths” is bound to be rendered into representations of this reality. Orientalism as such, as examined and argued by Saïd, is a reflection of this unavoidable reality of representations. One should always be conscious of knowledge being framed and interpreted through various lenses and contexts and attempt to limit this distortion as much as possible, yet also be aware of the boundaries of this exercise for ‘truth’.

**Orientalism as a theory is full of flaws and contradictions**

**Elif notes 4/11**(Elif Notes, 04-11-2022, "Edward Said’s Orientalism: Various Flaws and Weaknesses," ElifNotes, https://elifnotes.com/edward-saids-orientalism-flaws-and-weaknesses/)**//BRownRice**

Edward Said’s Orientalism is his signature contribution to literary criticism and academic life. The book questions a pattern of misrepresentation of the Orient (East) by the Occident (West). It argues that there had never been a neutral scholarship that studied the Orient. This is because those who were doing the study belonged to the West. This fact exercised colonial power over those being studied. This unequal power relation created the very object of study. It means ’we’ could study ‘them’ because ‘they’ were separated from ‘us’ and subject to ‘our’ rule. The evaluation and critique of Edward Said’s set of beliefs, known as ‘Orientalism’, forms a significant background for postcolonial studies. Besides, it has also given birth to a new sub-discipline—the cultural study of colonialism. However, Edward Said’s Orientalism has various flaws and weaknesses as well. Various literary theorists, anthropologists, historians, and political scientists have often cited as well as criticized it. However, it received strong criticism from academic Orientalists, including some of Eastern background. Edward Said’s Orientalism made a parenthetical statement that ‘the world is made up of two unequal halves, Orient and Occident’. This statement presents a useful summary of the binary opposition he creates. Nevertheless, here Said acknowledges the obvious opposition of Orient and Occident. Whereas, at various stages in the text, he complicates the issue. He refers to Orient both in opposition to that which is ‘Western’ and also that which is ‘European’. At the same time, neglecting its already established natural antonym. Some Major Drawbacks of Said’s Binary Distinction Between the Orient and the Occident The dualistic definition of the Occidental half of the binary by Edward Said causes a great problem. It is obvious that he uses the two terms apparently interchangeably. Yet, despite the overlapping of definition to some extent, the lack of true synonymy between ‘European’ and ‘Western’ shows that it is no longer explicit what Said is suggesting the Orient (East) to be defined in opposition against. Since this binary construction is crucial to Said’s theory, if it is improperly explained or seems indistinct, the whole theory raises doubt. Said’s binary distinction between the Orient and the Occident further becomes doubtful by his discussion of the commonality of German Orientalism, American Orientalism, and Anglo-French Orientalism. By naming them separately, and in therefore acknowledging a difference as well as a commonality between the three, Said opens up the possibility of the existence of multiple Orientalisms rather than a single unified system of Western thought, which he elsewhere defines Orientalism as being. This concession to divisions within European thought, and further, between European and American thought, highlights the problems of trying to discuss and theories such large terms as Europe and Western. Moreover, Said discusses the problem he claims every writer on the Orient faces. These problems, in his views, are: “how to get hold of it, how to approach it, how not to be defeated or overwhelmed by its sublimity, its scope, its awful dimensions”. However, at the same time, he appears faced with similar problems of the sublimity, scope and dimensions of his terms as he discusses the Occident. EDWARD SAID’S ORIENTALISM: DEFINITION, SUMMARY & ANALYSIS Fractured Unity of Occidental Models in Edward Said’s ‘Orientalism’ As the unity of Edward Said’s Occidental models fractures, his binary system breaks down yet further. The central binary distinction between the Occident and the Orient becomes increasingly complex. For, it becomes more apparent that while we can define Europe and the West in relation to their differences with the Orient, so can we similarly define the West’s component parts in relation to their differences with each other. In this way, the binary opposition upon which Said’s premises his theory is problematic because he has defined it poorly. Moreover, Said theory also appears doubtful because of the reductive nature of the terms he uses. Such reductive tendencies are not only present in his discussion of Europe/the West/the Occident. They also appear to the same degree in his discussion of the Orient. In addition, while Said acknowledges the geographical span of the Orient, “which extended from China to Mediterranean”, and has already discussed the perils of sublimity in writing about the Orient, he nevertheless still seems to forget the cultural and societal span this sweeping labelling of ‘the East’ takes in, and continues to talk about the Orient as a single sublimed entity. Edward Said’s Orientalism Theory: Overshadowed by Improperly Defined Concepts Although Edward Said acknowledges Orientalism as ‘a Western style’. However, he seems to fall too easily into line with the western thought he critiques. He does so by delineating the Orient as a holistic unit because of its exoticism and its ‘otherness’ to the West, instead of any commonality of features within itself. By not seeking enough to define and question the concepts and labels he uses in his discussion, Said falls victim to their reification. This eventually makes Edward Said’s Orientalism theory overshadowed by concepts that he fails to define properly and gain control over. Also, this evidence seems to indicate the necessity of a number of different binaries to fully construct the complex system of interrelationships. These interrelationships are between the various acting nations and people in this discourse, rather than one simple distinction of the West and the East. READ BRIEF SUMMARY OF EDWARD SAID’S ORIENTALISM Major Flaw in Said’s Claim about the Orient’s Silence As we’ve discussed, Said’s often sweeping and reductive nature is explicit to an extent in his problematic use of the terms around which his argument revolves. Another example of such a generalizing tendency in Orientalism appears in his suggestion that: “Orientalism is premised upon exteriority, that is, on the fact that the Orientalist, poet or scholar, makes the Orient speak, describes the Orient, renders its mysteries plain for and to the West”. Another central aspect of Said’s theory is that the knowledge gained about the Orient from representations of it in literature, is crucial to the power the West held over it. In his own words: “Knowledge of the Orient, because generated out of strength, in a sense creates the Orient, the Oriental, and his world”. However, we can see such writers such as William Jones, Warren Hastings, Robert Southey, William Hodges as Said describes. That is, to speak for the Orient, and thus, to create it in the minds of their readers. While, theirs are not the only representations of the Orient that exist. Often cited as an Indian author’s first text in English, The Travels of Dean Mahomet (1794) is quite significant in this regard. An autobiographical book , it is an instance of the exception of Said’s generalized rule of exteriority. Its production and existence is enough to dispute Said’s claim about the Orient being spoken merely from the outside—the West. Mahomet’s work clearly defies Said’s convention. It is an explicit example of a description of the Orient, rendering its mysteries plain and clear for the West, not written by an external ‘Orientalist’, a European poet or scholar travelling in the East. However, its author is an Indian writer who has travelled in and emigrated to Europe. Edward Said’s Orientalism Theory: Based Upon A Generalized & False Assumption Therefore, Edward Said’s Orientalism theory seems based upon a generalized and a false assumption that ‘such an Orient was silent’. Although very much in the minority, the existence of Mahomet’s text rejects Said’s notion of such silence. The book further reveals that it is not the imperial eyes’ that solely created the Orient. However, the representations of the East by the Eastern people also played a role in its creation. Nevertheless, Mahomet is not simply an Indian writer who offers a simple refutation of Said’s claim of exteriority. Instead, since he migrated to Europe, Mahomet is a hybrid figure, as culturally English as he is ethnically Indian. Similarly, his text is a hybrid. Other European Orientalist texts seem to influence it in style and possibly in content. Yet, it is also different due to his different view of events. Although Mahomet’s text doesn’t base on exteriority to the Orient to the same degree as works by contemporaneous writers, neither can seem the work of a completely Oriental insider. It shows that there are certain complexities surrounding Mahomet’s location as a writer. Therefore, his work’s example cannot completely disprove Said’s claim of Oriental exteriority. However, it does highlight the fact that there are elements to Said’s Orientalism that he oversimplifies and doesn’t explore as fully as he might have done. For Said to claim that “Orientalism is premised upon exteriority” is as reductive in its own way as the earlier problems surrounding his definition of the binary opposition of the Orient and the Occident. This is because it is without examination of a character like Dean Mahomet or other recourse to evidence and examples. Conclusion As I’ve demonstrated in the above argument, Edward Said’s Orientalism theory has certain flaws and weaknesses. However, in spite of these flaws and weaknesses, there is a also testament to the importance of Said’s work. That is, it provoked such criticism and debate nearly two decades after its publication.

**Orientalism is too totalizing of a theory and doesn’t allow us to learn about the Middle East**

**Jones 8**(Johnathan Jones, 5-22-2008, "Orientalism is not racism," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/jonathanjonesblog/2008/may/22/orientalismisnotracism)**//BRownRice**

Romanticised but not out of contempt ... The Snake Charmer by Jean-Léon Gérôme A woman wraps a giant snake around her nude form as north African men in a picturesque variety of costumes look on in J-L Gérôme's 19th century painting The Snake Charmer. She stands on a Turkish carpet; the entire scene is permeated by sexy blue light reflected off a tiled wall. This is the "orient" as imagined by a 19th-century European. You can see why Penguin in the 1980s chose it as a cover image for the paperback of the critic Edward W Said's famous book Orientalism. The appositeness of Orientalism, first published in 1978 and one of the most influential books of the last 30 years, to the present moment is obvious. Writing at a much earlier stage in America's relationship with the Islamic world, Said analysed what he claimed to be certain enduring structures of western thought about the "orient". These structures were established by European intellectuals in the 19th century - he argued - and taken up in the 20th by American scholars. The Orient, he suggests, was a lurid fiction of otherness that afforded westerners a valuable territory of fantasy and desire - as Tate Britain's exhibition, The Lure of the East: British Orientalist Painting, which opens on June 4, will surely illustrate. And yet, this western fascination was in no sense humanising. Orientalism, he argues, produced not real understanding but knowledge that was power: the racist claim to omniscience summed up by one of his chapter headings, "Knowing the Oriental". Advertisement Let me be frank. I think Orientalism is more than just a bad book. It is a bad book that legitimates bad politics. It is a great wedge of dishonesty that has begat a great mountain of ignorance. It is a treason of the clerks, an intellectual fraud that justifies bigotry and hatred. Said's book licenses the claim that any and all statements by westerners about the Middle East can be dismissed as worthless and racist. Anything a European says about a range of subjects from the Pyramids of Giza to the stories of Sinbad the Sailor to the nature of Islamic art can be assumed from the start by readers of Orientalism to be orientalist - or latterly, Islamophobic. In fact, the very writers and scholars analysed by Said tell a different story. One of the first works of Orientalism that he discusses is the vast Description of Egypt, ordered by Napoleon and researched by a team of French scholars whose work was eventually published in a series of monumental volumes by 1828. From this staggering work, Said quotes no more than a paragraph of its preface. In this one paragraph, he finds evidence that Napoleon's scholars saw Egypt as a theatre of colonial power. In fact, the paragraph, itself fairly anodyne, looks irrelevant when you examine the Description as a whole with its meticulous drawings of stingrays and snail shells and careful records of engineering machinery used to pump water from the Nile, ploughing techniques, and costumes. Can all this be lumped together as one colossal discourse about a fictional Orient? Was Napoleon saying Egyptians were like fish? Advertisement The real story here, that Said reveals against his intentions, is the remarkable fact that Europeans and Americans in the 19th century knew more about the cultures of the Middle East than we do now. They read the Tales of the 1001 Nights and dreamt of the Alhambra. Was this just a complacent Imperialist celebration of power, based on the contrast between nostalgia for the great Oriental past and contempt for the Arab present? No, I think there was real curiosity and admiration. But where has it gone? Today the west is bleakly incurious about the history of Islam, its art, peoples and learning. There's a blank wall of terror. This wall has been strengthened by Said's book because it closes down a crucial way for cultures to encounter one another: it closes down romanticism. The first time I visited Granada and walked through the stucco-laden, tile-glistening rooms of the Alhambra, I had no doubt this triumph of medieval Moorish architecture was the most beautiful building I had ever seen. I also reached quite naturally for "orientalist" metaphors to describe it to myself - in short, I felt like I was riding on a magic carpet. I still think that's a reasonable way to evoke in words the feeling of lightness the Alhambra creates. To see - and love - Islamic art in this way is not a style of contempt. It is not patronising. It is not racist, and it is the very opposite of Islamophobic. In censoring such longings, Said's book has for 30 years helped to ensure that white Europeans and Americans become progressively more ignorant of the Islamic world. It is a modern classic - of fear and loathing.

**AT: Orientalism- Said’s“Ideal type”**

**Said’s narrative of Orientalism contains a damaging paradox in which he seeks to reject typification of “the orient” yet himself typifies European civilization as an “Ideal Type”, an agent of Orientalism creating an essentialist simplification**

Sara R. **Farris 10**[Sara R. Farris, Senior Lecturer in Sociology at Goldsmiths, University of London , "AN ‘IDEAL TYPE’ CALLED ORIENTALISM",7-19-2010, Taylor & Francis, https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/1369801X.2010.489701, 1LEE]

The ‘whole **impulse to classify nature and man into types’** (Said 2003: 119), **for Said, was one of the elements that prepared the way for modern Orientalist structures**. ‘In natural history, in anthropology, in cultural generalization, **a type had a particular character which provided the observer with a designation** and, as Foucault says, “a controlled derivation”’ (ibid.). Said goes on to **list such designations: ‘the wild men’, ‘the Europeans’, ‘the Asiatics’** and so on. The practice of **classification, as Said recognized, became crucial to sciences**, both natural and social. However, in the field of the social sciences and humanities it resulted in the assembly of human/cultural types, thus producing stereotyped images of cultural collectivities. As we have seen, Said acknowledged that Max **Weber's ideal** types played a central role both **in shaping the ways in which classification was employed by European** – **but also North American** **– social sciences and in assembling non-western cultures and individuals into Orientalized types**.

**Said** was thus very insightful when he **recognized a certain instrumental** and summational function of the **notion of the ideal type.** Its main problem and dangerousness, for Said, lay in the nature of the ideal type itself, as a way of simplifying and naturalizing the Other (especially the Oriental Other) as an articulation of a geographical, historical and sociopolitical entity with immutable traits. He also recognized the pervasiveness of this notion in contemporary intellectual work. As he writes, ‘still, th**e notion of a type – Oriental, Islamic, Arab, or whatever – endures and is nourished by similar kinds of abstractions or paradigms or types as they emerge out of the modern social sciences’ (**Said 2003: 61, my italics).

The characteristics of ideal types as **the modalities and the outcomes of conceptualization and classification** proper to social sciences are the result of Weber's epistemological presuppositions. Ideal types express Weber's neo-Kantian conception of the relationship between reality and knowledge in which the former is a meaningless infinity in constant change, to which human beings give their own meanings, and the latter is the rigorous, disciplined capacity of the scientist to put some order in this chaos. **The ideal type**

**is** **a conceptual construct which is neither historical reality nor even the ‘true’ reality**. It is even less fitted to serve as a schema under which a real situation or action is to be subsumed as one instance. It has the significance of a purely ideal limiting concept with which the real situation or action is compared and surveyed for the explication of certain of its significant components. (Weber 1949: 93)

The ideal type thus appears as a ‘telescope’ or a ‘yardstick’ (Mommsen 1974) **used in order to comprehend reality.**

Within Max Weber's comparative studies on world religions, the method of the ideal type functions as a tool for the ‘**conceptualization’ and ‘classification’ of different social phenomena** by means of focusing upon a specific point of view, or ‘perspective angle’. Thus Weber applied it in his historical comparative studies in order to classify religious prescriptions regarding economic activity into ‘types of economic ethics’, and came up with a typification of different societies as those geoculturally and geopolitically unified constellations that Said criticized as essentialist and stereotyped.

Each of Weber's studies on Weltreligionen thus leads to the **formulation of types of ‘civilizations’ that in the end seem to be assumed as uniform and static**. As a result, as many subsequent critics have emphasized, the variables ‘time’ and ‘history’ are cancelled from these unifying/essentializing ideal types (Fischoff 1944; Robertson 1933). Even Parsons had to admit that Weber ‘tended to treat typical motives … as rigidly unchangeable entities [and] used ideal types to atomize his material into rigid units which could only be combined and recombined in a mechanistic way or absorbed into higher-order patterns’ (Parsons 1963: lxiv).

Said, on the other hand, although he does not offer such an extensive methodological reflection as Weber, refers explicitly to Foucauldian concepts of discursive formations in methodological terms. Nonetheless, **several criticisms** of the same kind as those addressed to Weber's ideal types **have also been made of Said's multifaceted definition of Orientalism** (Clifford 1988; Porter 1994). The tendency towards a certain semantic **shifting in his definition of Orientalism** and the **association between very different authors who belonged to very different countries** and epochs are aspects of Said's work that have been criticized precisely because of a certain ultimate disregard for the variable ‘history’. As Porter has argued, ‘[**Said] fails to historicize adequately the texts he cites and summarizes, finding always the same triumphant discourse where several are frequently in conflict’** (1994: 160).

We could go further by noting many more similarities between Said's discourse and Weber's ideal type. **Orientalism shares with Weber's notion of the ideal type** the one-sided viewpoint of departure and focus that implies the choice of what aspects or objects can enter into the definition (or class). Thus, Said chose to focus on British, French and American Orientalism, while leaving aside other writings. Like Weber's ideal type**, Orientalism** tries to view with the same ‘telescope’ centuries of history and the most disparate writings and authors**, thus often risking annihilating history and dehistoricizing the object of investigation**. Similarly, Weber and Said share an attitude of beginning the classification with the purpose of providing a historical account of the object under investigation (namely, the origin of the spirit of capitalism in Weber, and the origin of Orientalism in Said), thus attempting to find its starting point. In a further moment, however, this point is then lost in the beginning of human history. In Weber it was to be the sixteenth century of the Reformation, but then became the beginning of rationalization in its march from pre-Christian history right up until the disenchantment of the world in Protestant Europe. In Said, Orientalism at one stage is the discourse constructed ‘politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period’ (Said 2003: 3) and then progressively goes back to the Middle Ages with Dante Alighieri and then to that virtual place that Said calls ‘imaginative geography’, which makes us set arbitrary boundaries according to a ‘universal practice of designating in one's mind a familiar space which is “ours” and an unfamiliar space beyond “ours” which is “theirs”’ (53–9).

In the end, and at a more substantial level, **the central similarity between Weber's ideal types of Oriental civilizations and Said's ideal type of Orientalism lies in their very content**: in their geopolitical and geocultural ‘nature’ as immutable and determining traits. The mere fact of belonging to them affects ideas, cultural and intellectual practices and identities. We might recall that **by ‘Orientalism’ Said means**, among other things, ‘European culture’ and ‘**Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient’** (Said 2003: 3). Thus the Orientalist discourse belongs to ‘Europe’ and the ‘West’ as autonomous entities, and it ends up being the ideal type of the attitude adopted by westerners towards the Orient, in a pure geocultural, crystallized fashion. Said's (and several postcolonials’) tendency to **treat Orientalism as a geographical and ‘civilizational’ entity** has been brilliantly highlighted by Fernando Coronil (1996) and Neil Lazarus (2002). The former notes how ‘typical markers of collective identities, such as “territory”, “culture”, “history” or “religion” appear as autonomous entities … [and] as with commodities, the material thing-like, tangible form of geographical entities becomes **a privileged medium** to represent the less tangible historical relations among peoples’ (Coronil 1996: 77). As a consequence, **the Orientalist typifying or summational attitude,** strongly criticized by Said for the generalizations and essentialization of the non-western territories and cultures it provided**, is the expression of a territorial entity itself,** a territorial entity **which in turn has been unified and generalized by Said in a common type: European culture.**

Said was certainly correct to identify in the European social sciences dealing with non-western societies and in particular Weber's ideal types the danger of essentialist simplification that, at its core, was informed by a Eurocentric attitude. Nonetheless, **when he accused Eurocentrism of essentializing non-western societies,** of neutralizing their internal differences and their history, of addressing artificial entities such as the ‘Orient’ or ‘Islam’ and the like, he himself ran the risk of **an essentialist simplication**. This is to say that he committed the error of adopting a similar conceptual structure in relation to Europe or the West, conceived as geographical, geopolitical, geocultural abstract categories.

Beyond Orientalism

As Said clearly recognized, the most important task of all would be that of undertaking ‘studies in contemporary alternatives to Orientalism, to ask how one can study other cultures and peoples from a libertarian, or a non-repressive and non-manipulative, perspective’ (Said 2003: 24). This is certainly a difficult task, for which answers on the level of meta-reflection – epistemological and/or methodological – seem to be inadequate and misleading.21 **Said** was well aware of the importance of such a task; indeed, his critique of the manipulative and repressive depictions produced by European scholars during centuries of uneven relations between the West and the East was designed precisely in order to open the space for such non-repressive perspectives. Nonetheless, while conducting this critique, he **employed a methodological and theoretical apparatus** much closer to that which he criticized than he thought.

The concept of discursive formation, used by Said in order **to describe Orientalism** both as the discourse produced by colonial rulers and as the discourse that performatively produced them, recalls Weber's analysis of **the active dimension of the relationship between religion and political power**. This pattern of thought seems to affect also their reciprocal anti-Marx (and anti-Marxist) critique, as well as a certain epistemic ambiguity according to which representation is never, and can never be, ‘objective’ or ‘true’. At the same time, both affirm that the task of the intellectual is to speak ‘truth’ to power and politics. In this way, **the realm of politics becomes the locus** in which determining decisions that ‘truly’ act upon reality can be made.

Yet, in the last instance, the decisive affinity between Weber and Said lies in the way in which both conceptualized their object of enquiry: **Said**, not less than Weber, **produced an ‘ideal type’ of the West as the geographical, geocultural and geopolitical agent of Orientalism**. However, while the formulation of a ‘civilizational’ and ‘geocultural’ ideal type was precisely Weber's goal, in his search for the origin of Europe's accomplishments in comparison to the East, Said's goal was that of demolishing this ‘civilizational’ attitude that, according to him, helped to immortalize the Orient as the static, geocultural entity thus depicted by European writers. The conceptual coordinates that he employed for **his analysis**, however, arguably **run the risk of unwittingly reinforcing** such **‘civilizational’ attitudes**.22

**This internal paradox strongly weakens Said's critique**, not only in intellectual terms, as a source of contradictions or incoherence, but especially **on the level of what his critique aimed to be**: that is, an instrument for the pursuit of studies not affected by a manipulative and repressive perspective. If the origin of this manipulative perspective is thought to lie in a sort of geographical entity, or immutable ‘cultural’ essence (regardless of whether it is the European or the Oriental), it obviously becomes much more difficult, if not impossible, to produce a **counter-non-manipulative perspective from within**.23 Said's critique has been important for the humanities and social theory as a stimulus for rethinking some foundational categories and in terms of disciplining a certain politico-theoretical ‘arrogance’. The time has perhaps come, however, to **rethink the terms of this critique itself,** if we are to find a way to move beyond the ‘ideal type’ – and reality – **that lies at the heart of Orientalism.**

**FW**

**T/L**

**A relational approach to digital sovereignty centering the national Self and its Other is key**

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**What is to be gained from a relational approach to digital sovereignty?** This article argued that centering the relationship between the national Self and its Others in the analysis of national digital sovereignty **elucidates why and how** it emerges and develops. This argument bridges two established claims from constructivist theories of culture and technology. One is that national identity as articulated and propagated by governing elites guides the state’s technological program. Another is that identity is an inherently relational category that is maintained through continuous boundary making between the Self and its Others. Taken together, these claims indicate that it is **analytically productive** and sometimes **imperative to attend to relational dynamics between the national Self and its Others to grasp the logics of digital sovereignty**. To illustrate this proposition, this article traced how Estonia’s cultural constructions of its Russian and Western Others shaped the contours of its digital sovereignty. It showed that Estonia’s digital initiatives, which are often couched in technofuturistic postnational discourse, are meant to reaffirm Estonia’s sovereign territorialized existence within the Euro-Atlantic community.

Whereas this article examined digital sovereignty as an elite political project manifested in highlevel official discourses and institutions, the relational lens’s theoretical and methodological versatility **opens the door** for diverse scholarly approaches to digital sovereignty. Ethnographies of infrastructure, for example, can investigate Self-Other dynamics in the everyday workings of digital sovereignty, what cultural anthropologist of technology Alix Johnson (2021) conceptualizes as the “mechanics of sovereignty.” This approach treats sovereignty as a process of material construction and explores its constitutive people and practices. Lorraine Kaljund (2018), for instance, draws on participant observation and interviews with the developers of a recent e-Estonia initiative, data embassy, to explore how this team embeds ethnocentric Estonian statehood into the project’s software, code, and policy.

Another dimension to consider is domestic power struggles over competing constructions of Otherness and technology. Analyses of debates and decision making surrounding digital sovereignty, particularly the **use of Othering to legitimize one’s technological agenda**, illuminate how and why some ideas but not others become state rhetoric and policy. The official e-Estonia narrative retroactively frames Estonia’s digital turn as a self-evident response to Soviet occupation and a reflection of ethnic Estonians’ natural predisposition toward technology. Yet, when Estonia’s ruling coalition first promoted the project of digital transformation in the early 1990s, as part of their Western-oriented ethnocentric platform, it was not uniformly supported across the political spectrum. How did e-Estonia become political dogma, the questioning of which is seen as tantamount to undermining Estonia’s Euro-Atlantic credentials and benefiting Russia? Detailing national technopolitical struggles would help show digital sovereignty as always a product of political contention, including over membership in the national imagined community.

Further, sociological approaches might explore how Self-Other dynamics manifest within the circles directly involved in the making of digital sovereignty. Historically, dominant ethnic and political elites excluded their Others from creating and enjoying technological innovation on par with the privileged group (Edgerton, 2006, pp. 131–136). Scholars of e-Estonia note that the country’s digital elite—entrepreneurs, developers, policy makers—remain almost exclusively ethnically Estonian (Kattel & Mergel, 2019, p. 147) and that national digitization does not benefit the social and professional standing of ethnic Estonians and Russians equally (Drechsler, 2018, p. 13). In Estonia and elsewhere, future research could employ the relational lens in examining the **structural barriers to participation in the making of digital sovereignty** and the **consequences** of such representational imbalances.

Specific manifestations of Self-Other dynamics on digital sovereignty will vary across national contexts. The analytical task of the relational approach is to discover and conceptualize Others and then empirically demonstrate their material significance for digital sovereignty. Beyond the nation-state, the relational approach potentially applies to other types of digital sovereignty conceptualized by scholars, such as municipal, personal, indigenous, corporate, and others.

**Essentialism DA**

**Essentialism DA: Said’s analysis of hegemonic discourses creates a binary of East and West which serves to uphold the very westernism he criticizes – takes out any links to hegemony too**

**Potter 19**(Naomi Potter, Orientalism: in review, Jan 15, 2019, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/lseupr/2019/01/15/orientalism-in-review/)**//BRownRice**

Said’s essentialising of the Western scholars does not constitute the start and end of his problems in Orientalism. Turning to Said’s (mis)use of Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony can help us to illustrate instances of essentialism in categories of East and West in Orientalism which goes beyond Western scholars. Said draws on the role of hegemony, the presence and construction of ‘certain cultural forms which dominate over others’ (2003: 6-7) in order to demonstrate how Orientalism managed to take a sustained position as the hegemonic discourse, being internalised by Western and Eastern cultures alike. However, Said does not explore the concept fully, in particular he fails to offer the necessary depth in Gramsci’s concept of hegemony as distinct from those such as Hegel and Marx. For Gramsci, hegemony, unlike mere domination, is not something held over another group but rather the result of complex interplay of societal forces and groups (Stein and Swedenburg, 2004: 9-10). Hence, Gramsci had a unique focus on the active nature of counter-hegemony in history: its role in the ‘war of positions’ which helps to determine the character of the hegemonic forces (Chalcraft and Noorani, 2007). A complete Gramscian analysis of hegemony would therefore offer great depth in studying counter-hegemonic forces as active, autonomous agents in terms of their role, position and culture (ibid.). There seems to be a distinct lack of reference to such agency of subaltern groups in Said’s work (Ahmad, 1992: 108). Given the time in which Said was writing and the proliferation of such forces this does not seem acceptable. For instance, James McDougal illustrates the influence that religio-cultural resistance of Islamic Algerians had on French colonial policy and the distinctive practice by which the French ruled; such as citizenship policies regarding the settlers vis-à-vis the colonized (Chalcraft and Noorani, 2007, 49-66). These Islamic liberation forces such as the Association of Algerian Muslims had been active for decades before Orientalism was published (ibid: 56). Said misses the importance of the agency of counter-hegemonic forces in terms of the nature and force of hegemony itself. This has the unfortunate impact in his work of reflecting a specific idea of the eastern world as passive and incapacitated, paradoxically leading to the assumption he wants to criticise: that of an eternally distinct and less powerful Eastern region. The essentialist implications of Said’s misuse of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony do not end here, however. Hegemony does not concern just polarized forces but also the way in which it persists in culture within society at large. Said often refers in his work to the role of literature and culture, however, in this exploration he neglects to consider the many different forms in which culture is constructed, beyond the dominating group itself. Melman, in observing the role of women in constructing parts of the Oriental narrative, highlights how ‘Europe’s attitude towards the Orient was neither unified nor monolithic’ (1992: 7). In particular, she turns to the role of women from the West in depicting Eastern regions. The perspectives of these women often included more richer self-criticism towards cultural superiority. Gramsci’s account of hegemony necessarily involves an extension of analysis to include this intersectional group who are a subset of the bloc of Europeans who explored, observed and studies the Middle East in the colonial period. In ignoring the role of women in the construction of Western hegemony Said makes uncritical assumptions about the core features of Western culture, locating them in the writings of academics throughout history and thus essentialising the notion of the ‘West’ as a perpetually dominating and uniform region of the world. Conclusion Said’s failure to fully utilise the theoretical richness of the theories and concepts which lay the foundations for his account led him to essentialise the categories of East and West in Orientalism. Firstly, in using historical methodology, Said obscures his attempts at a Foucauldian discourse analysis generating a historical account which does not do enough to interrogate the mechanisms by which Orientalism comes about, seemingly presupposing their existence in Western scholarly writing. Furthermore, this is only made worse by his neglect of important aspects of the building of hegemonic discourses which leads him to simplify both Western and Eastern cultural production, making uncritical assumptions about their core features of these categories and the extent of variation within them. Both these errors lead to a paradoxical account from Said as his intentions were not only to avoid such essentialist narratives but also to critique them. Despite these intentions however his treatment of East and West does suffer due to his theoretical shortcomings leading to essentialist construction of the categories.

**Binary DA**

**Orientalism causes the problems it attempts to prevent by exacerbating divisions between the east and west**

**Owen 12** [Owen, Roger, Roger Owen is the A.J. Meyer Professor of Middle East History at Harvard University and was previously the Director of the university’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies., 4-20-2012, "Edward Said and the Two Critiques of Orientalism," Middle East Institute, https://www.mei.edu/publications/edward-said-and-two-critiques-orientalism]//AA

Back to the Social Sciences When it comes to the immediate reception of Edward’s work, it was not only many Orientalists, or near-Orientalists, who were **upset** but also many well versed in what they regarded as a **progressive** **science** of society. This certainly applied to persons such as Harry Magdoff, the New York editor of the Monthly Review, who asked me to review Orientalism, a book about which he had very mixed feelings. It was also true of colleagues such as Fred Halliday, who argued that **Orientalism** could easily be read as **creating** an irreconcilable **division** between East and West, thereby **undermining** one of the basic features of our universalistic approach. No less telling was Fred’s second argument that, for many peoples of the Middle East in the 1970s, works by the scholars Edward defined as **Orientalists** were sometimes the **only** source of **data** for understanding large parts of their own national **history**. Al-Azm was to make the same point only a few years later. Several enormously important implications follow. The first is that we need the social sciences in Middle East studies not just for their own sake, but also to be able to **continue** to make use of works by persons we regard as **Orientalists**, though without falling prey to their **assumptions** and reductionism. This is the more significant as our own thinking contains either unexamined assumptions from the Orientalist period or, at the very least, questions which we cannot help students to answer properly because we do not know how to frame them or where to look for answers. A good example of this is what used to be called Islamic legal studies, studied only through certain canonic texts, and posited on the notion that the master story was one in which modern legal codes imported tout court from the West quickly supplanted so-called traditional Shari‘a law, confining it simply to the area of personal status.

**AT: Digital Orientalism**

Digital orientalism is not the driver behind hardline US foreign policy against China – American trust in the technological leadership of other Asian countries such as South Korea prove that it isn’t orientalism but rather the existential security threat from Chinese hacking and intellectual theft that necessitates US action.

**Moore ‘22** [Gregory J. Moore; Professor of Global Studies and Politics, Colorado Christian University; 6-3-22; “Huawei, Cyber-Sovereignty and Liberal Norms: China’s Challenge to the West/Democracies”; https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11366-022-09814-2#Sec4; accessed 7-19-2022; AH]

Said’s orientalism construct [26] is an important contribution to the study of colonialism, post-colonial thought, international relations and sociology. There is no reason to challenge it here. It’s application to the digital realm is an interesting and important one. The premise of the editors of this special issue is that the West expected China to evolve into a liberal democracy, but that this has not happened, and moreover this (from the West’s perspective “fundamentally illegitimate”) power has been able to increasingly compete head to head with the US and the West in military, political, economic and technological terms, and this has created deep fear among Western/democratic leaders. Fear is a key part of this orientalist narrative. The argument is that it is fear of this digital, political and cultural other that drives a tough US, Australian, British (for example) policy toward China, and drives a harsh stand toward Huawei. To set this up in a cause and effect framework, then digital orientalism is the independent variable that causes fear in the US and others towards China, that brings about the dependent variable, harsh policies toward China and Huawei specifically. What this would mean is that other factors would not explain the dependent variable, the harsh US/Western policy toward Huawei. The question we will pose here is, is this correct? There are **several** potential **problems** with this argument. First, establishing that fear is an independent variable is not easy. Despite the quality of their work generally speaking, the editors have not done the thick description necessary to establish this. Simply showing tough rhetoric, hawkish views on the US/Western/democratic side (which are indeed there), does not really **do the job effectively**. Second, we haven’t considered **counterfactuals** or ruled out other methods that might test our hypothesis or do a better job explaining the outcome we observe (the harsh US/Western policy toward Huawei) than the proposed independent variable, **digital orientalism**. Following on from this point, I would propose a consideration of the hypothesized independent variable, “China and Huawei pose **credible threats to national security** of the US and other democracies” as a way to understand the approach the US, Australia, the UK and others have taken toward Huawei. Securitization provides a way of looking at this issue that is helpful in this case. As Buzan, Waever and de Wilde [3: 25] put it, Securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects…The way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations: When does an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed? There can be no doubt that in the United States, Australia, India and other countries, Huawei’s 5G offerings have been securitized, and this is evident by the “discourse and political constellations” in those and other countries, as I’ve illustrated above. Yet why hasn’t this been the case in all countries? As Buzan et al. note, referencing the work of Arnold Wolfers [3: 30], security threats may be objective/real, or subjective/perceived, and where the twain meet or diverge is not always easy to ascertain. It is possible that A. China’s Huawei is **acting as a threat** in some countries and not in others. It’s also possible that B. China’s Huawei and its 5G are a threat wherever they operate but some countries don’t yet understand that or don’t believe it. It’s also possible that C. Huawei and its 5G are not a threat and have simply been socially constructed as a threat, needlessly securitized. The notion that digital orientalism is the reason for the securitization of Huawei and its 5G would line up with the last tack, or C. The argument presented here, however, is that digital orientalism does not explain the US/Western/democratic response to China’s growing **illiberal impact** on global internet governance or its worrisome presence, via Huawei, in more and more national 5G internet infrastructure schemes. On the contrary, the hypothesis posed here is something like B. above, that real security concerns do, that the securitization of Huawei is **not an irrational response** to Huawei 5G because of 1. some of Huawei’s actions/**track record**, 2. the nature of its relations with the Chinese state, and 3. the track record or broader actions (now and in the past) of that Chinese state at home and abroad as it regards media **freedoms, intellectual property theft, human rights problems**, and more. Having said this, digital (or conventional) orientalism may be lurking in the background and exacerbating technological and political dynamics. I suspect it is. The editors are likely not incorrect in that sense, for certainly there is a sense that China represents a “digital other,” a “political other” and a “cultural other” for Westerners and Liberals in general, and the notion of digital orientalism may explain certain aspects of that. At the same time, the argument presented here is that a careful study of China’s practices in the cyber-realm, whether at home or abroad,Footnote9 make it clear that there are very clear **security-centric reasons** for concern about China’s and Huawei’s presence in 5G internet infrastructure construction, mobile phone handset production, and even Chinese apps like TikTok and WeChat, which India has banned, and both of which the Trump Administration tried but failed to ban in the US. US, Australian, British, Swedish and other countries’ increasingly robust pushback against Huawei and other Chinese players in the construction of global 5G infrastructure can be easily understood by studying A. China’s cyber practices at home and abroad, and B. the impact they have on the security (and perceptions of security) of nations they work with. Very simply, those pushing back see what China is doing, they don’t like it, and they don’t want Chinese companies to have any major role in constructing telecommunications infrastructure inside their countries. This is because they believe they know what that will lead to, and they don’t believe that is good from their perspectives. If China/Huawei was a player like Nokia, Ericsson or Samsung, the US and these others would not be raising alarms. In fact, the US, Australia and UK have not been raising alarms about Nokia, Ericsson or Samsung, the other major players in 5G. Why? Is it digital orientalism? In fact, given that Samsung is Korean, one might expect the US to **push back against Samsung**, for it too is “**oriental**,” non-Western, following the logic of Said. We don’t really see that, however. **South Korea is a democratic polity** and a US ally, so there is no angst on Washington’s part, no concerns about security. Moreover, the South Korean government does not have a history of stealing US IPR, of spying on the US as China has been, or doing anything that could be considered a national security threat toward the US, so there has been **no pushback from Washington in the face of Samsung’s** growing presence in the US or in US 5G operations. Some argue that the US simply **refuses to yield the number one spot** to anyone, whether in technology or in economic dominance. Yet if the US was pushing back against Huawei because the US wanted to be number one, because the US wanted to dominate, why wouldn’t the US fund AT&T, Apple, Google or someone else in the US to be number one? Why wouldn’t the US hinder the advances of Nokia, Ericsson and/or Samsung in the US and elsewhere? We don’t really see any of that, however. Digital orientalism **doesn’t really explain this**, in this case. I will argue here that it’s because first, American thinkers do not think in such hierarchical terms as their Chinese counterparts do (they aren’t unified in an obsession with being number 1 as is the case with the Chinese state and its companies; see [18]. Second, the US is not pushing back against Huawei primarily because of market imperatives/motivations, but rather because of concerns about security and lack of trust in the Chinese state and Chinese companies that are subject thereto. The **US trusts** the leadership of **Nokia, Ericsson and Samsung**, and they don’t see their home governments (Finland, Sweden and South Korea, respectively) as bent on spying, stealing IPR and undermining free expression at home and increasingly around the world. It’s about the Chinese state’s **very bad track record** of **stealing intellectual property**, of **suppressing free expression**, of cyber-surveillance and **hacking**, of **suppressing truth** and suppressing dissidents – increasingly not only inside China but abroad as well.Footnote10 Pushing back against Huawei and China’s cyber-sovereignty model has become an **existential fight** for those who see things in the way I have depicted here. In a telling statement by former Obama National Security Advisor Susan Rice to Canada’s CBC about the security threat Huawei posed to Canada and others, Rice said,

**Link**

**No China Link**

**The China threat is real – any notions that suggest otherwise are equally orientalizing – turns the K**

**Dicicco et. Al 20**(Jonathan M. Dicicco, Ja Ian Chong, Tadeusz Kugler, Jack S. Levy, J. Patrick Rhamey Jr., Yuan-Kang Wang, AyŞE Zarakol, Steve Chan, November 9 2020 "Roundtable 12-2 on Thucydides’s Trap? Historical Interpretation, Logic of Inquiry, and the Future of Sino-American Relations," H-Diplo | ISSF, https://issforum.org/roundtables/12-2-thucydides)**//BRownRice**

Indications exist that the Xi leadership may be less satisfied with the status quo than Chan claims given that current PRC actions push up against not only the United States and Taiwan. South Korea reported economic punishment from China as a result of the deployment of a missile defense system to guard against possible North Korean attacks and repeated dangerous behavior by Chinese fishing vessels.[8] Japan expressed concern over increased naval and aerial activity by PRC assets in and over contested areas.[9] Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam indicate growing PRC harassment of their fishing and other civilian vessels in the South China Sea, which is notable given that Indonesia and the PRC do not have overlapping territorial claims.[10] Then there are tensions along the Sino-Indian border that recently resulted in deadly clashes between Indian and Chinese troops.[11] Current PRC behavior is worrisome for regional actors in other ways as well. Australia reports economic pressure for not conforming to Beijing’s preferences on pushing for an open investigation into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic and complaining about PRC efforts to influence its internal politics.[12] Along with Canada, Australia saw citizens detained and charged for illegal activities under suspicious circumstances.[13] Singapore too faced Chinese state pressure over its insistence on adherence the rule of law over the arbitration over the South China Sea brought by the Philippines against the PRC.[14] That such issues do not receive more treatment by Chan is curious since they raise questions about PRC’s commitment to self-restraint and can potentially trigger the chain-ganging effects on U.S.-China ties that Chan warns readers about (21-22, 211-215). Such friction can potentially harden positions and raise the stakes over an issue such that prevailing becomes more tied to status and other concerns, driving more aggressive and even revisionist behavior.[15] Chan’s finding that misplaced worries about the PRC and its intentions stem in part from misunderstandings of perspectives on international politics that are informed by theories from “the West” rather than China deserves elaboration and debate. So-called “Western” international relations theories often have parallels in the Chinese tradition, broadly construed. Work analyzing Spring and Autumn, Warring States, Song, and Ming documents indicate that the strategic thought that is prominent in these periods closely resembles statecraft familiar to those in the contemporary “West.”[16] Texts as varied as the Han-era annals Records of the Grand Historian and the Ming-era fiction Romance of the Three Kingdoms will suggest the same.[17] Parallels between “Western” and “Chinese” approaches to politics are unsurprising. Several millennia of collective human experience, thought, and debate over statecraft, conflict, as well as governance are almost certainly bound to produce similarities in responses. Dividing the world into “Western” and “Chinese” views of the world ignores the fact the PRC has disagreements with ostensibly “non-Western” polities such as India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, each with their own distinct philosophical traditions.[18] Also, despite sharing cultural origins, people in the PRC and on Taiwan disagree fundamentally issues of political values and rights, not the relatively simple issues of who should rule China or what a Chinese state should entail geographically.[19] Moreover, the PRC’s ruling Chinese Communist Party draws at least some of its inspiration from European thinkers in the form of Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin. Successive dynasties from historical China also proved themselves very adept at conquest—that is how regimes and empires get built.[20] Attributing tensions between the United States and PRC to culture suggests an overly monolithic view of the rich and varied philosophical and political traditions both major powers draw from, giving them less credit than is due.[21] To claim that contemporary international scholarship and U.S. policy are unable to adequately understand China because they are “Western” may oversimplify the nature and seriousness of problems dogging U.S.-China relations and their consequences for the world. Relegating difference to culture is not only Orientalizing, it can encourage a misplaced expectation that understanding can bring some sort of happy, mutually acceptable outcome. Perhaps Beijing and Washington understand each other well. They simply disagree fundamentally over values and interests in ways that make finding mutually acceptable accommodation increasingly difficult. This does not have to imply that either side is morally superior or normatively “better” than the other, just that understanding provides little promise for improving relations and avoiding confrontation. Better accounting for such possibilities invites fuller consideration of the roles that agency and contingency play in major power relations, two features that Chan clearly identifies as critical in the volume. Thucydides’s Trap? deserves much credit for grappling with important, pressing, and difficult questions about the drivers behind the downturn in U.S.-China relations and possible ways to address this slide. Yet, Chan’s outlook is more similar to Graham Allison’s than he initially lets on. Allison’s call for creative statecraft is possible only if the United States and China are not locked in a structural situation which neither can escape or beset by contingent circumstances that prevents Washington and Beijing from effectively exercising the agency Chan believes is central. Chan offers some insight when he points to divergences in perspectives between Washington and Beijing but may be overly limiting the ways he conceives of effects of culture and socialization. Likewise, the volume can go further in conceptualizing the various ways third parties such as regional actors and international organizations can affect U.S.-China ties, given that world politics is not just major powers going at each other—a fact both Chan and Allison recognize. Major power interactions simply do not occur in a vacuum. Such dynamics may reinforce competition as much as ameliorate them, but their effects await further clarification and explanation.

**The idea we need to protect the Chinese people from their own tech is dumb and founded in sinotechnophobia**

**Mahoney 22** – Professor of Politics and International Relations at East China Normal University (ECNU); Executive Director of the International Center for Advanced Political Studies (ECNU); Founder and Director of the International Graduate Program in Politics (ECNU); Senior Research Fellow, Institute for the Development of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics at Southeast University in Nanjing (Jiangsu's leading think-tank); Associate Editor, US-based Journal of Chinese Political Science (SSCI), Associate Editor, and Co-Editor, ECNU Review. With more than 200 publications and a winner of multiple teaching and research awards, he appears frequently on global broadcasts (350+), including CGTN, CCTV, BBC, Airing, RT International and TRT World, and is a regular contributor to China Radio International’s The Beijing Hour and RTHK’s Backchat (Hong Kong). He was a member of the Chinese team that translated Jiang Zemin’s Selected Works into English and subsequently a Senior Researcher with Beijing’s leading think-tank, the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau. He is a regular contributor to South China Morning Post and Beijing Review, among others. Prior to his doctoral studies he was a public health officer with the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC/ATSDR). (Josef, “China's Rise as an Advanced Technological Society and the Rise of Digital Orientalism.”, 6/14/22, Europe PMC, <https://europepmc.org/article/pmc/pmc9194893>, Accessed 7/19/22)//mackerel

The key point here is not to debate the pros and cons of these changes but to note that since Liberation (1949) and especially 1978, China has rapidly developed as an advanced technological society. This development is vital for independence and security but also a key source of global technological culture. This transformation is not confirmed **solely** by China’s advances in technologies, for example, e.g., quantum computing, artificial intelligence, green energy and space exploration, or social media. Rather, **in tandem with China’s advanced social and political organization**, we can note the widespread presence of **the modern cogito–consciousness**, all of which reflect industrial ratiocination, industrial production, industrial education and so on, and all of which are consistent with technological society [41, 51].

Western theorists have long debated the utopian and dystopian aspects associated with becoming a technological society. In the East, in many instances, modernity emerged at speed when possible to counter Western tech-supported imperialism [81]; but in the West, the development of technological society was always resisted by and in negotiations with traditional values and practices. Even in modern Western philosophy, the critical tradition has regarded technological advances as being mostly negative. Ellul’s critique and Heidegger’s nightmare have already been mentioned, but these were inspired by Friedrich Nietzsche, and before him, Søren Kierkegaard, who saw in ‘modern man’ an abomination of being [3, 18, 79]. In the post-war period, these concerns were expressed by the Frankfurt School, but also in Michel Foucault’s works, which equated modernity with totalizing systems of control, with an unrestrained biopolitics and governmentality manifesting in modern schools, hospitals, prisons and so on, all of which were driven by the psychological and physical discipline imposed by the modern market economy [55]. Like Nietzsche, Foucault romanticized certain aspects of Platonic and Stoic philosophy, while Kierkegaard and Ellul did something similar with Christianity—with Ellul going so far as to describe mankind in modern technological society as the “new demons,” as “mature insects that have nothing left to do but reproduce themselves and die” ([13] vii). In short, these theorists have had a profound influence on Western society, and all the more so because their critiques reflected the deep existential fears associated with Western modernity: these have included an Orientalist pride in the West for creating modernity, and the **unease** that this creation inescapably has always been a double-movement of the **becoming and unbecoming of the West itself.**

In China, however, a different critical tradition was established as a solution to the even bigger **existential crisis** of **foreign domination**. On the one hand, the proliferation of Marxism and especially **Marxism-Leninism** substantially **normalized tech**nological **development as** a **historically necessary** step for human progress, one that viewed technology and consciousness as advancing and converging as and through the state itself. On the other hand, this was not deeply at odds with Chinese tradition, particularly the Confucian tradition, one in which technique in the form of ritual (li) was to be perfected by the individual, whether the emperor, the gentleman, the father, as exemplars of the ritual that constituted an advanced state of being (e.g., see [50]). Thus, while some Chinese traditions certainly resisted development, China’s rapid advancement as a technological society finds **accordance with its traditional and modern philosophical perspectives on human progress**, and not just the existential necessity of closing the technology gap to establish and sustain sovereignty.

It’s in this context that we can view broad popular support for Chinese development as a technological society in China itself in terms of high rates of new technology adoption [39], popular support for scientific solutions to problems, and mass positive engagement in public policies that aim for social advances consistent with both individual and national transformations that are forward-reaching, tech-based and tech-oriented [70]—exemplified most recently by broad popular support for China’s “dynamic zero-covid policies” (dongtai qingling).

While the West worries over the pervasiveness of technology and the relatively unrestrained power and influence of big technology firms, while it worries over the erosion of traditional values, privacy, and so on, while such resistances have been most recently on display with broad pushbacks over attempts to formulate effective responses to the COVID-19 pandemic, **we see the opposite in China.** Broad popular support has greeted, effectively demanded and made possible dynamic zero-covid policies, along with the rapid development and deployment of zero-covid technologies [29]. This does not mean that Chinese people have liked the costs associated with the policies [78], but they have preferred the benefits over the absence of effective controls [35]. And before this, surveys indicate approximately **80% of respondents** have **supported** the **development and implementation of China’s “social credit system”** (shehui xinyong tixi), although the system is still incomplete and some doubt it will achieve its stated objectives, or do so with reasonable risks to personal privacy [33].

To be fair, not all innovations are popular. For example, although it’s still early days in the development and roll-out of China’s new digital yuan (shuzi renminbi), anecdotal reports suggest less than enthusiastic receptions among the general public. Nevertheless, tech-oriented innovations are **popularly understood as essential for improved governance**, including anti-corruption efforts, poverty alleviation, and market management, and they are reinforced with popular regulations designed to limit the power of tech firms and harmful social effects associated with technology, like unhealthy screen times among school age children. Furthermore, big tech advances, like 5G, are celebrated, and names like Huawei are embraced as a matter of national pride, with domestic sales soaring in response to international rejections of the same. The key point here is that China’s actualization as a technological society that **advances with tech**nology is **broadly popular**, that it’s **even valorized** by Chinese theorists as **consistent with the rise of an “intelligent civilization”** (zhineng wenming), one in which both governance and daily life are substantially supported by big data, artificial intelligence and other forms of digitalization [20, 84], and **consistent with Marxist theories of social progress** [76].

This isn’t to say that there are no pushbacks, no traditional values opposing, or again, that we don’t see periodic attempts to regulate and dismantle some technologies and tech firms. This has happened quite publicly with new laws policies directed at digital monopolies and anti-trust practices undercutting fair competition and governance, as well as other developments considered harmful to social and individual well-being. This was observed in enforcements against Alibaba in 2021, with implications for other firms (in 2022, new policies were announced to ease some big tech restrictions to help bolster an economy battered by lockdowns, but this does not signal a significant reversal of capacity or direction). Broadly, these regulations coincided with new laws related to digital finance and cryptocurrencies, but also video gaming, including limiting inappropriate content and imposing strict limits on children’s playing times (2021). Those policies were paired that same year with strict limits directed at buke—after-school study programs—which along with video games were assessed as having reached a tipping point of negative health effects and declining standardized test scores. In fact, these were new attempts at earlier policies with similar goals, e.g., efforts to limit teachers from assigning students unregulated, “off-the-books” homework through social media (initiated in 2018, and reinforced in 2021).

Overall, these policies were responses to pressures building over many years in different sectors. It bears noting that in the case of policies affecting children, there had long been efforts, often quixotic, to reign in China’s intensely industrial model of education [15, 86]; but these were more fully addressed at the height of China’s response to the pandemic. There is no evidence to suggest these policies were advanced because of the pandemic, i.e., when it was clear that online schooling in lockdown locations along with pandemic related social restrictions had made children even more vulnerable to digital exploitation and alienation, although such fears were acknowledged by some (see, for example, Wang et al. [77], Teng et al. [73], and Jiang, Tong, and Chen [31]). And they stand in **stark contrast with excessive gaming and increased digital-associated alienation** affecting American children in the same period and others around the world [17, 58], and for which there were little to no public policy responses.

But from a holistic perspective, these actions were not contrary to China’s emergence as a technological society but **consistent** with efforts to manage the well-being of that society as a whole, one in which governmentality is not understood as a conflict between the externality of a state and party vs. the internality of a more authentic or liberated individual existence, but as the **convergence of both as the same**, and **broadly consistent with shared thinking**, goals **and objectives**. Ideally, this is what a technological society would do, or else risk being less of a society and less capable technologically. So while we can point to Heidegger and Foucault and others as being horrified by such developments or less dramatically, the semi-luddite tendencies sometimes observed in European societies today, in fact, China’s emergence as a technological society is not horrific to most Chinese—**quite the opposite**. This development connected, however, to the **emergence in the West of a new Sinophobia and Sino(techno)phobia.**

**Realism is the true root cause of Wests response to China, not orientalism-doesn’t explain other “oriental” companies like Samsung not being pushed away**

Gregory **Moore 22**[Gregory Moore, Professor of Global Studies and Politics at Colorado Christian University, "Huawei, Cyber-Sovereignty and Liberal Norms: China’s Challenge to the West/Democracies",6-3-2022, SpringerLink, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11366-022-09814-2, 1LEE]

There are **several potential problems with this argument**. First, establishing that fear is an independent variable is not easy. Despite the quality of their work generally speaking, the editors have not done the thick description necessary to establish this. **Simply showing tough rhetoric**, hawkish views on the US/Western/democratic side (which are indeed there), does **not** really **do the job** effectively. Second, we haven’t considered counterfactuals or ruled out other methods that might test our hypothesis or do a better job explaining the outcome we observe (the harsh US/Western policy toward Huawei) than the proposed independent variable, digital orientalism. Following on from this point, I would **propose** a consideration of the hypothesized independent variable, “**China** and Huawei **pose credible threats to national security** of the US and other democracies” as a way to understand the approach the US, Australia, the UK and others have taken toward Huawei.

**Securitization provides a way of looking at this issue** that is helpful in this case. As Buzan, Waever and de Wilde [3: 25] put it,

Securitization is constituted by the intersubjective **establishment of an existential threat** with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects…The way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations: When does an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed?

There can be no doubt that in the United States, Australia, India and other countries, Huawei’s **5G offerings have been securitized**, and this is **evident by the “discourse and political** constellations” in those and other countries, as I’ve illustrated above. Yet why hasn’t this been the case in all countries? As Buzan et al. note, referencing the work of Arnold Wolfers [3: 30], security threats may be objective/real, or subjective/perceived, and where the twain meet or diverge is not always easy to ascertain. It is possible that A. China’s Huawei is acting as a threat in some countries and not in others. It’s also possible that B. China’s Huawei and its 5G are a threat wherever they operate but some countries don’t yet understand that or don’t believe it. It’s also possible that C. Huawei and its 5G are not a threat and have simply been socially constructed as a threat, needlessly securitized. The notion that digital orientalism is the reason for the securitization of Huawei and its 5G would line up with the last tack, or C.

The argument presented here, however, is that **digital orientalism does not explain the** US/**Western**/democratic response to China’s growing illiberal impact on global internet governance or its worrisome presence, via Huawei, in more and more national 5G internet infrastructure schemes. On the contrary, the hypothesis posed here is something like B. above, that real security concerns do, that the **securitization** of Huawei **is not an irrational response** to Huawei 5G because of 1. some of Huawei’s actions/track record, 2. the nature of its relations with the Chinese state, and 3. the track record or broader actions (now and in the past) of that Chinese state at home and abroad as it regards media freedoms, intellectual property theft, human rights problems, and more. Having said this, digital (or conventional) orientalism may be lurking in the background and exacerbating technological and political dynamics. I suspect it is. The editors are likely not incorrect in that sense, for certainly there is a sense that China represents a “digital other,” a “political other” and a “cultural other” for Westerners and Liberals in general, and the notion of digital orientalism may explain certain aspects of that. At the same time, the argument presented here is that a careful study of China’s practices in the cyber-realm, whether at home or abroad,Footnote9 **make it clear that there are very clear security-centric reasons for concern** about China’s and Huawei’s presence in 5G internet infrastructure construction, mobile phone handset production, and even Chinese apps like TikTok and WeChat, which India has banned, and both of which the Trump Administration tried but failed to ban in the US.

US, Australian, British, Swedish and other countries’ increasingly robust pushback against Huawei and other Chinese players in the construction of global 5G infrastructure can be easily understood by studying A. China’s cyber practices at home and abroad, and B. the impact they have on the security (and perceptions of security) of nations they work with. Very simply, those pushing back see what China is doing, they don’t like it, and they don’t want Chinese companies to have any major role in constructing telecommunications infrastructure inside their countries. This is because they believe they know what that will lead to, and they don’t believe that is good from their perspectives. If China/Huawei was a player like Nokia, Ericsson or Samsung, the US and these others would not be raising alarms. In fact, the US, Australia and UK have not been raising alarms about Nokia, Ericsson or Samsung, the other major players in 5G. Why? Is it digital orientalism? In fact, **given that Samsung is Korean,** one might expect the US to push back against Samsung, for it too is “oriental,” non-Western, following the logic of Said. We don’t really see that, however. South Korea is a democratic polity and a US ally, so there is no angst on Washington’s part, **no concerns about security**. Moreover, the South Korean government does not have a history of stealing US IPR, of spying on the US as China has been, or doing anything that could be considered a national security threat toward the US, so there has been no pushback from Washington in the face of Samsung’s growing presence in the US or in US 5G operations.

Some argue that the US simply refuses to yield the number one spot to anyone, whether in technology or in economic dominance. Yet **if the US was pushing back** against Huawei **because the US wanted to be number one**, because the US wanted to dominate, why wouldn’t the US fund AT&T, Apple, Google or someone else in the US to be number one? Why wouldn’t the US hinder the advances of Nokia, Ericsson and/or Samsung in the US and elsewhere? We don’t really see any of that, however.

**Digital orientalism doesn’t really explain this**, in this case. I will argue here that it’s because first, American thinkers do not think in such hierarchical terms as their Chinese counterparts do (they aren’t unified in an obsession with being number 1 as is the case with the Chinese state and its companies; see [18]. Second, the **US is not pushing back against Huawei** primarily because of market imperatives/motivations, but rather because of concerns about security and lack of trust in the Chinese state and Chinese companies that are subject thereto. The US trusts the leadership of Nokia, Ericsson and Samsung, and they don’t see their home governments (Finland, Sweden and South Korea, respectively) as bent on spying, stealing IPR and undermining free expression at home and increasingly around the world. It’s about the Chinese state’s very bad track record of stealing intellectual property, of suppressing free expression, of cyber-surveillance and hacking, of suppressing truth and suppressing dissidents – increasingly not only inside China but abroad as well.Footnote10 Pushing back against Huawei and **China’s cyber-sovereignty model has become an existential fight** for those who see things in the way I have depicted here. In a telling statement by former Obama National Security Advisor Susan Rice to Canada’s CBC about the security threat Huawei posed to Canada and others, Rice said,

It’s hard for me to emphasize adequately without getting into classified terrain how serious it is…It gives the Chinese the ability, if they choose to use it, to access all kinds of information. Civilian intelligence, military, that could be very, very compromising. So as much as I disagree with the Trump administration on a number of things, on this I believe they are right [15].

Given how much Rice was opposed to Donald Trump and almost all he stood for, her agreement with him on this issue is striking. It seems clear that this was no election-year posturing on the Trump Administration’s part, though that is how the Chinese government tends to frame it.Footnote11 Huawei’s building and operation of 5G networks in other countries poses serious challenges to the security of potentially any host-country, and what is being argued here is that this is the reason for the increasing push-back, the securitization moves, China and Huawei are facing as Huawei tries to expand its 5G operations abroad.

Toward the ends of explaining how and why Huawei 5G gets securitized in some places and not others, I think it is possible to take Buzan, Waever and de Wilde’s securitization a bit further. I don’t see regional security complexes (a key factor in their work) at play in a prominent way here, because the array of countries that have aligned in opposition to Huawei are more diverse than any regional framework could accommodate, with Sweden, Australia, India, the UK and the US all saying no to Huawei, whereas Germany, South Korea, and Canada are keeping the doors open. The US, for example, has close allies on both sides of this digital divide, and there are members of China’s region/neighborhood who are on both sides of this divide as well, all of which is to say that neither alliance patterns or regional patterns clearly explain the digital divide over Huawei.

I think another concept found in Buzan, Waever and de Wilde’s work [3] better explains it, with the help of an expansion of another of their concepts. The first concept referenced here is that of security constellations (p. 201). Buzan et al. define them as “a much wider concept than security complexes, reflecting as it does the totality of possible security interrelationships at all levels” (p. 201). They add, “security constellations will almost certainly generate a much fuller set of nonregional subglobal patterns (such as those created by the sets of countries that export copper or those countries vulnerable to seal-level rises” (p. 201–2). Considering the range of Buzan et al.’s “sectors” (ie, military, environmental, economic, societal and political sectors), it is not clear where one would locate cyber, however. Given that the work being referenced was published in 1998, it seems logical that two new sectors should be added to Buzan et al.’s sectoral framework, and this is the conceptual expansion referenced above: that of cyber and space sectors. While space as sector is yet relatively underdeveloped, cyber is a sector that has grown apace in recent years and should now be considered a sector in its own right, as might be evidenced by the addition of “Cyber Commands” and like agencies to the arsenals of many nations today, whereas none existed only a few short years ago. With the addition of a cyber sector and the interrelation of this sector with extant sectors like military, economic and political sectors, for example, it is clearer to see how a security constellation encompassing all of these might interplay so as to bring about the digital divide we’ve seen over Huawei’s participation in 5G network construction. For example, whereas Sweden does not have to worry about a direct military threat from China as it does from neighbor Russia, it does operate in a security constellation wherein China’s economic interests (and actions) and the nature of its political sector/system are such that Sweden perceives a threat. In the same way, whereas South Korea has a more immediate potential threat from China militarily (after all, S. Korea’s mortal enemy North Korea is China’s ally, and S. Korea’s ally the US is China’s chief adversary), it does not apparently view China (or at least Huawei) with as much trepidation as the US does. It may be that it doesn’t see its own interests as being as divergent from China’s as the US does. It may also be that its cool relationship with Japan for reasons of unresolved history puts it in closer ideational orientation to China (with which it shares some anti-Japanese historical angst) than, again, would be the case with the US. Cyber is just one part of a constellation of security interests between these many players and **so a simple digital orientalist**, geopolitical, economic or alliance-driven **explanation** **alone does not** really **do justice to the broader complexity of interests and issues that drive issues or sectors like cyber.**

**Alt**

**T/L**

**The squo solves and any alt fails**

**Owen 12** [Owen, Roger, Roger Owen is the A.J. Meyer Professor of Middle East History at Harvard University and was previously the Director of the university’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies., 4-20-2012, "Edward Said and the Two Critiques of Orientalism," Middle East Institute, https://www.mei.edu/publications/edward-said-and-two-critiques-orientalism]//AA

Second, we need to **continue** the good work of **combining** training in languages, history, and culture with training in the social sciences begun in most American and European centers of Middle Eastern studies. One without the other is no longer enough — and is no longer seen to be enough. Third, the social sciences provide a necessary additive to works of analysis which operate simply at the level of discourse and the various ways this has been used to answer questions with little or no attention to what I would still want to call material reality. Last, but not least, and in answer to those critics who accuse Said-influenced social scientists of managing to avoid most of the important political and ideological issues of the moment, we now have the tools to make important contributions to such vital contemporary Middle Eastern subjects as military occupations, religious politics, the explosive growth of the Gulf port cities, and Islamic banking, not to mention the enormous **impact** of **globalization**, where a **knowledge** of the history of the region has to be combined with an ability to pick out and to **describe** those **underlying** structures, dynamics, and trajectories which **define** them now and will continue to do so in the future. All this is good news, and would certainly be good news to Edward Said himself. Given that the field of modern Middle East Studies is only some 50 years old, that it had to extract itself from the hold of a first generation of scholars who still saw the Middle East in very reductionist, ahistorical terms, and that it takes time to build up a core of experts versed in language, history, local knowledge, and the social sciences, we finally have a set of praiseworthy scholars. Conclusion It is important to see Edward Said’s work, and the mixed reception it received, in the round. This means reading Orientalism as carefully as its author would wish and then being able to understand its role as the **first** part of a project which **required** the construction of **alternative methodologies** as its complement. Inevitably, this **alternative** project proved to be much more **difficult** for reasons Edward himself could not anticipate and for which his own critique shares a small part of the blame. Nevertheless, viewed from the perspective of modern Middle East studies, the **present** and the **future** look surprisingly **good**, with the ever **expanding production** of highly skilled graduate students around the world well-supplied with the tools not just to make use of whatever data the field contains but also to use their knowledge of the various social science disciplines to **challenge** the conventional **wisdom** and the old paradigms which continue to stand in the way of a proper understanding of how Middle Eastern societies, economies, and political systems really work.

**Said’s goal of Orientalism was to critique an existing system, not establish any sort of alternative.**

**Owen 12** [Owen, Roger, Roger Owen is the A.J. Meyer Professor of Middle East History at Harvard University and was previously the Director of the university’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies., 4-20-2012, "Edward Said and the Two Critiques of Orientalism," Middle East Institute, https://www.mei.edu/publications/edward-said-and-two-critiques-orientalism]//AA

Given the temper of these times, it was also natural that those early social science critics of Orientalist scholarship should band together in workshops around joint projects designed to employ what we identified as the German-style 19th century “critique” — both to **expose** the **lack** of real **explanatory value** in traditional **Orientalism** and to begin to provide what we took to be a more **useful** way of studying the modern Middle East. This included, among many other issues, an attempt to come to terms with the way in which not just the traditional academic Orientalists but also several of the founders of Western social science, most notably Marx and Weber, held Orientalist-type views concerning a fundamental difference between East and West. Furthermore, also in anticipation of Edward Said, we had begun to discuss the ways in which our own social science disciplines, anthropology in particular, played a major role in what Talal Asad called the “Colonial Encounter.” Edward Said himself was well aware of what we were attempting — via our Review of Middle East Studies — having had his attention drawn to it by Fred Halliday, a very important figure in my story. Nevertheless, for a number of reasons, while Edward could commend us for working, as he put it, in “disciplines not fields,” I do not think he had any **real understanding** of what practicing these disciplines actually involved. This was partly the result of his inclinations, character, and training. He was a **humanist** through and through, seeing the world via the optic of literature, music, and the arts, **not** by the use of supposedly **value-free** economics, political science, or **sociology**. Just as important, as he explained to me, he had come to the end of his year at the Institute of Advanced Studies in Palo Alto tired out by writing Chapters 1 and 2 and in such a hurry to finish that he raced through Chapter 3, “Orientalism now,” without either thinking through his argument as far as the relationship between Orientalism and the modern centers of modern Middle Eastern studies was concerned, or paying much attention to the alternatives which he left, clearly and specifically, to others. As he puts it in the book’s **rushed**, last few pages: … in conclusion, what of some alternative to Orientalism? Is this book an argument only against something, and not for something positive? And then, having spent a sentence mentioning a number of what he called “new departures,” including the work of my own group — called the Hull group after the venue of our first few workshops — he notes that he does not attempt to do … more than mention them or allude to them quickly. My project has been to **describe** a particular system of ideas, **not** by any means to **displace** the system of ideas, not by any means to displace the system **with** a **new** one.

**AT: retooling rhetoric alt**

**The alt recreates the epistemological failures they try to critique**

**Eun 18**(Yong-Soo Eunm Yong-Soo Eun, PhD, is Associate Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Hanyang University, South Korea, and the Editor-in-Chief of the Routledge series, IR Theory and Practice in Asia. Yong-Soo is broadly interested in IR theory, pluralism in social and international studies, emotion, and the international politics of the Asia-Pacific region. His work has been published in scholarly journals including Review of International Studies, PS: Political Science and Politics, Perspectives on Politics, and The Pacific Review., 10-17-2018, "Opening up the debate over ‘non-western’ international relations," SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0263395718805401)**//BRownRice**

Criticisms At the same time, a number of empirical, epistemological, and normative criticisms have been raised against attempts to develop a Chinese IR theory and (by extension) ‘non-Western’ IR. Empirically, Asian IR are not fundamentally different from those of Europe, in the sense that anarchy, survival, and the balance of power have been the key operating principles of state-to-state interactions since the pre-modern period. For example, based on a detailed archive analysis of China’s foreign relations under the Song and Ming dynasties, Yuan-kang Wang concludes that in the ‘anarchical’ international environment at that time ‘Confucian culture did not constrain … [Chinese] leaders’ decisions to use force; in making such decisions, leaders have been mainly motivated by their assessment of the balance of power between China and its adversary’ (Wang, 2011: 181). This finding leads Wang to defend the theoretical utility of structural realism based on the Westphalian system. Epistemologically, too, critics point out that it is ‘unscientific’ to emphasise and/or incorporate a particular culture or the worldview of a particular nation or region into IR theory, for a legitimately ‘scientific’ theory should seek ‘universality, generality’ (Choi, 2008; Song, 2001). Mainstream (positivist) IR theorists and methodologists argue that IR studies ought to seek observable general patterns of states’ external behaviour, develop empirically verifiable ‘covering law’ explanations, and test their hypotheses through cross-case comparisons. For example, Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba make it clear that generality is the single most important measure of progress in IR, stressing that ‘the question is less whether … a theory is false or not … than how much of the world the theory can help us explain’ (King et al., 1994: 101, emphasis in original). From this perspective, any attempt to develop an indigenous IR theory, be it non-Western or Western, is suspect because it delimits the general applicability of theory. In the case of a Chinese IR theory, criticism of this kind can increasingly be found in studies by younger Chinese IR scholars. According to Xinning Song (2001: 68), Chinese scholars, especially younger ones who have studied in the West, think that it is ‘unscientific or unnecessary to emphasize the so-called Chinese characteristics’. A similar criticism can be found among Korean IR scholars in regard to attempts to build a ‘Korean-style’ IR theory (Cho, 2015). Critics of the ‘Korean School’ of IR frequently ask how can we make a distinctively Korean IR theory while trying to be as generalisable as possible? In Jongkun Choi’s (2008: 215) words, ‘any theorising based on Korea’s unique historical experiences must be tested under the principle of generality’. Normative criticisms of attempts to build a ‘non-Western’ IR theory highlight the relationship between power and knowledge. Critics point out that although theory-building enterprises from the perspective of the ‘non-West’ commonly begin by problematising Western-dominated IR, the ongoing scholarly practices and discourses associated with ‘non-Western’ IR can also entail (or reproduce) the same hierarchic and exclusionary structure of knowledge production, which can fall prey to particular national or regional interests. For example, in his discussion of Chinese visions of world order, William Callahan doubts the applicability of ‘Tianxia’. He claims that what the notion of Tianxia does is ‘blur’ the conceptual and practical ‘boundaries between empire and globalism, nationalism, and cosmopolitanism’. Rather than help us move towards a ‘post-hegemonic’ world, Tianxia serves to be a philosophical foundation upon which ‘China’s hierarchical governance is updated for the twenty-first century’ (Callahan, 2008: 749). Supporting this view, Ching-Chang Chen (2011: 1) argues that: re-envisioning IR in Asia is not about discovering or producing as many “indigenous” national schools of IR as possible. Scholars … must also recognise and resist the pitfalls of equating the mere increase of non-Western voices with the genuine democratisation of the field, if they are to live up to their responsibility to jointly construct a non-hegemonic discipline. In a similar vein, Josuke Ikeda (2011: 12–13) argues that ‘there needs to be a “post-Western” turn rather [than a] “non-Western” [one] … in order to address another kind of “Westfailure” in IR theory’. In short, critics argue that although it is our ‘responsibility’ to make IR more pluralistic and democratic, ‘most intellectual endeavors to construct non-Western IRT in Asia run the risk of inviting nativism’ (Chen, 2011: 16). Most recently, Andrew Hurrell (2016: 149–150) has added that although developing culturally specific ways of understanding the world ‘undoubtedly encourages greater pluralism’, attempts to do so can also lead to a national and regional ‘inwardness’ that works to reproduce the very ‘ethnocentricities’ that are being challenged.

**Anti-eurocentrism fails**

**Anti-eurocentrism is flawed and unneeded – western-centrism’s role in IR has decreased exponentially**

**Kuru 15**(Historicising Eurocentrism and antiEurocentrism in IR: A revisionist account of disciplinary self-reflexivity, DENIZ KURU\*, sep 21 2015, page 352-353)**//BRownRice**

‘All scholars are Eurocentrics’: The limits of anti-Eurocentrism What can be seen as a major problem with critics of Eurocentric IR is their tendency to overstate the impact of Eurocentrism as an ideology by confusing it with a more geo-historically situated form of Eurocentric world order. Stated differently, anti-Eurocentrics do not differentiate in general between Eurocentrism as an ideology (one that sees Europe, or a more global West as the only active subject of world politics) and Eurocentrism as a picture of the world that derives from the significance of European powers at a certain point in time, basically from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries. This perception leads the critics to exaggerate the extent of Eurocentrism in IR. Virtually all forms of analysis that give a prominent role to the European (and Western) actors in the global political order come to be seen as Eurocentric. Whenever a scholar chooses to focus on the significance of the European powers (or the impact of the West), [they are] targeted as Eurocentric.3 The extent of this problem becomes more visible when considering the work of anti-Eurocentric scholarship, which demonstrates an unending circle of intra-IR disciplinary blaming and bashing. For instance, feminist IR scholarship points to the prevalence of Eurocentric biases among their more mainstream colleagues.4 In turn, they are accused by Hobson of Eurocentrism. He sees in feminist IRʼs focus on women in the Third World ʻthe risk of returning us back into the Eurocentric cul-de-sac of rendering Eastern women as but passive victims of Western power, thereby stripping them of agencyʼ. 5 Postcolonialists criticise in turn the approach most closely associated with Hobsonʼs approach, that is, historical sociology for carrying Eurocentric features.6 Finally, postcolonialists are attacked by advocates of decolonising approaches who find the presence of Eurocentric positions in the work of the former.7 This inherent race to the bottom in the form of accusing others as Eurocentrics demonstrates that a mere proliferation of anti-Eurocentric analyses will not suffice to de-Eurocentricise IR. Otherwise, disciplinary self-reflexivity will be reduced to blaming others for Eurocentrism without turning to a broader contextualisation of and variation between Eurocentrisms. It should be evident that this would help us neither in reducing the actual impact of ideologically motivated Eurocentric analyses in the discipline nor in gaining a better understanding of our own positions and scholarly motives. A major aspect in this context concerns the differences between the continuing impact of European/Western influences in todayʼs world and the way in which Western-dominated power-knowledge connections of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are to a certain extent overcome. Although many scholars criticise IRʼs Eurocentrism for the close relations they find between knowledge (production) practices and the supposed power impact of the West, they overlook the extent to which the gradual decline in the Westʼs power has also changed these interactions. This means that one has to approach Eurocentrism in a more nuanced fashion so that the residual impact of the Western powersʼ relatively decreasing global significance can be recognised as the instantiation of a gradual process of de-Eurocentricisation that goes in line with a less Western, more post-Western world. Immanuel Wallerstein speaks of ʻanti-Eurocentric Eurocentrismʼ. According to him, this form of Eurocentric scholarship asserts either that Europe just interrupted others from doing what they were doing and did it herself, or that Europe did something which was just ʻa continuation of what others had already been doing for a long time, with the Europeans temporarily coming to the foregroundʼ. To overcome such anti-Eurocentric Eurocentrism, scholars must ʻcease trying to deprive Europe of its specificity on the deluded premise that we are thereby depriving it of an illegitimate creditʼ. Wallerstein suggests that ʻ[w]e must fully acknowledge the particularity of Europeʼs reconstruction of the world because only then will it be possible to transcend it.’ 8 Following this assumption, even Hobsonʼs anti-Eurocentrism emerges as an instance of Eurocentrism, for he tends to look for non-Western origins in virtually all historical developments of the modern era, overlooking thus the extent to which the Western dominance in the nineteenth century made its previous interactions with the non-Western actors less relevant when thinking of Eurocentrism in that era.9 I turn to a detailed examination of Hobsonʼs approach after providing a more differentiated typology between various forms of Eurocentrism. As another example in which Wallerstein would have seen anti-Eurocentric Eurocentrism, one can refer to Kerem Nişancıoğluʼs recent study on the peripheral role given to the Ottoman Empire in studies of capitalist development. He argues that IR ʻhas been built on largely Eurocentric assumptionsʼ with the Ottomans being ʻabsent, passive, or merely a comparative foil against which the specificity and superiority of Europe has been definedʼ. 10 His counterpoint is that the Ottoman Empire ʻwas arguably the most powerful actor in the Early Modern periodʼ. Based on his employment of Trotskyʼs theory of uneven and combined development, the combined impact of Ottoman strength and Europeʼs privilege of backwardness would lead the latter (especially its northwestern parts, that is, England) to gain ʻthe geopolitical space required to conduct modern state-buildingʼ. Thus, Nişancıoğlu presents a revision of the historical sociology of international relations, which he accuses of being too concentrated on European history. The point of contention is about conditions affecting the birth of modern capitalism. However, it is possible to see this as another issue, one that is researchable in a historical framework without accusations of Eurocentrism. Nişancıoğlu himself is careful to add that his goal is not ʻto argue that capitalismʼs origins were entirely extra-Europeanʼ nor to ʻseek to substantially diminish the centrality or uniqueness of Europe in this processʼ. 11 These are big caveats that show that even self-declared non-Eurocentric accounts recognise Europeʼs specific role in the emergence of the modern world order. Hence, it becomes possible to reject Nişancıoğluʼs general critique of IRʼs Eurocentrism, for his own work illustrates that the broader assumptions of IR still hold with regard to Europeʼs dominant role in the emergence of modern capitalism and the international order associated with it.

**Asian Futurism fails**

**Asian futurity gets coopeted by the same neoliberal contradictions it tries to overcome**

**Bahng 15** (Aimee Bahng | “The Cruel Optimism of Asian Futurity and the Reparative Practices of Sonny Liew’s Malinky Robot” | *Techno-Orientalism: Imagining Asia in Speculative Fiction, History, and Media* pg 163-165 | DOA: 7/17/2022 | SAoki)

The cover of Kishore Mahbubani’s 2008 publication The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East presents readers with what seems to be the global sign for financial growth: skyscrapers under construction. Cranes perch atop every tower, suggestive of the “all-at-once-ness” of growth in Asia. The illuminated construction site stretching into the night sky highlights the unrelenting pace of growth, which proceeds even as the rest of the world sleeps. The scene is a familiar one, prefigured by the race for the tallest building that ran across parts of Asia (Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan) in the early 2000s. 1 But the unpainted, all white structures feel eerily hollow and decontextualized. There’s no sign of the human laborers who welded and wired these structures. The lot is all but empty, with the exception of one nondescript car parked in the foreground. This scene of speculative building— construction predicted but not contracted to sell—feels like an already haunted future, in which “New Asia” has become an empty lot, evacuated of its denizens and prepared to signify the **sheer potential of capital**. Published amid the financial crisis of 2008, Mahbubani’s book, as well as his Financial Times declaration of a realizable Asian Century that serves as this essay’s epigraph, excite what Alan Greenspan once called “irrational exuberance.” Uttered in a speech Greenspan gave in 1996, in his capacity as chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve, the phrase characterized the “unduly escalated asset values” of Japan’s economic bubble. The next day, Tokyo’s stock market fell sharply, closing 3 percent down, and Greenspan’s speech largely presaged the Asian financial crash a year later. The extent to which economic projections hang on the words of figureheads like Alan Greenspan demonstrates how such **speculations work as performative speech acts that call the future into being**. Similarly, the optimism Mahbubani announces in forward-looking, prophetic tones (“optimism will deliver the Asian Century”), affectively structures speculative investment in Asian futures. This vision of the new Asian hemisphere, colonized by empty high-rises reaching toward limitless horizons and built by deterritorialized workers, projects a future of automated speculative building, fueled by investment hungry banks. If Greenspan and Mahbubani both grasp how their respective declarations of pessimism and optimism will affect the global economy, they do so with two different Asias in mind: Japan of the late 1990sand Singapore at the dawn of a “new Asia” in 2008. 2 The so-called Asian Century, toward which Mahbubani’s optimism strains, functions as a largescale speculative fiction spawned from neoliberal fantasies that capitalize on a literary genre’s already problematic investments in techno-Orientalism. In their 1995examination of techno-Orientalism, David Morley and Kevin Robins call attention to U.S. and European fantasies of Japan and its shift in those imaginaries in the 1980s from an exotic playground to a land of emotionless automatons. Perhaps epitomized by Western dystopian cyberpunk such as Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (1982) and William Gibson’s Neuromancer (1984), techno-Orientalism figures the Japanese as “unfeeling aliens; they are cyborgs and replicants. But there is also the sense that these mutants are now better adapted to survive in the future”(170). While Morley and Robins understand techno-Orientalism as primarily born out of Western anxieties about Japan’s challenge to U.S. economic hegemony, they also suggest more specifically how techno-Orientalism arises just as Japan emerges as “the largest creditor and the largest net investor in the world” (153). What Morley and Robins never fully develop, and what I want to explore in more depth here, is this coordinated turn toward Asian futures in both financial and cultural forms of speculation. Mathematical models of probability and investment strategies based on extrapolation are forms of speculative fiction that project finance capitalism’s visions of futurity onto the world. Interdisciplinary scholarship from the past two decades has pointed to the performative aspects of economic speculation (MacKenzie, Muniesa, and Siu), the sociological systems of financial markets (Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger), the impact on subjectivity of financial instruments such as derivatives and debt bundling (LiPuma and Lee), and the “financialization of daily life” (Martin). Because speculative economies rely ever more on rhetorical tools and narrative strategies to explain and market the practice of trading on futures and securities, financial speculation and speculative fiction both participate in the cultural production of futurity, and futurity becomes the arena in which new subject formations emerge. Does techno Orientalism register anxieties about finance capitalism, or does finance capitalism use techno-Orientalism as a basis for its extrapolations of futurity? I emphasize the co-constitutive relationship between the cultural production and financial worlding of Asian futurity. A peculiar question arises then, when Asian economic and political architects themselves participate in the projection of Asian futurity, all the while drawing on a techno-Orientalist toolkit. I argue that critical analysis of the discursive site of Asian futurity reveals points of contradiction in American neoliberalism as it travels that have to do with earlier forms of racial and colonial subjugation providing the scaffolding for the architecture of neoliberalism itself.3 As Asia develops its own neoliberal rhetoric, articulating its own futurity poses certain problems that necessitate a disavowal of the racism of techno-Orientalism. What stands in to “smooth” that difficulty is the heteronormativity techno-Orientalism always espoused that Asian futurity posits anew as part of its road map, capitalizing on aspirational teleologies, valuations of privatized worth, and nationalisms consolidated through processes of racialization. I focus my investigation on techno-Orientalism’s role in the production ofa global neoliberal subject in contemporary Singapore, where a tech economy adopts and adapts localized versions of seemingly universalized notions of “the good life.” Building on Lauren Berlant’s theorization of “cruel optimism,” this essay levies a critique of “the Asian Century” as imagined by economists around the world. It argues that a revisionist Asian futurity needs to intervene in the neoliberal orientations of “the good life” and, in the face of foreclosed futures, open possibilities of what Eve Sedgwick has called “reparative practices.”

Sinofuturism merely flips a Western binary of either a China stuck in the past or one stuck in the future – that denies China the agency to ever challenge the destruction of their coevalness and instead perpetuates a techno-orientalist fantasy about an exotic futuristic China.

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This genealogy of temporal othering evidences how both **sinofuturism** and technoorientalism are not merely **culpable of propagating exoticizing fantasies** about the future in China or other Asian contexts, but also responsible for perpetuating a more generalized **denial of coevalness**. In contrast with established orientalist tropes and with more recent liberal-democratic varieties of “sinological orientalism” (Vukovich), China is no longer deemed to be trapped in its atemporal pastness or condemned to eventually synchronize with modernity: instead, it already inhabits the future, arrives from it, or beckons a Chinese mode of futurity with global implications. In all these variants, **sinofuturist imaginations** **deny China the possibility** of challenging and negotiating representation in the coeval present staked out by Western knowledge production. The future is for sinofuturists what the past was for orientalists: a foil for steering representation by denying coevalness. The legitimacy of sinofuturism is premised on a parallelism with other emerging articulations of futurity: the comparative approach proposed by Armen Avanessian and Mahan Moalemi, for example, juxtaposes it with Afrofuturism, gulf futurism and other ‘ethnofuturisms’, highlighting the novel emergence of futureoriented imaginaries from non-Western contexts. While this approach cautions that futuristic articulations “outside of the west and across the Global South and other former peripheries can also evolve into neo-colonial tendencies” (Avanessian et al. 9), it also **glosses over** a more fundamental problem of **serializing ethnic** or national futurisms: their reference to the future might be the only contact point between otherwise radically different aesthetic and ethical programs—something that the history of Italian futurism **glaringly evidences**. Even Lawrence Lek’s artwork Sinofuturism (1839-2046 AD), which has become a defining reference for this term, repeatedly reaches for a common tactical repertoire among “minority movements which share an optimism about speed, velocity, and the future as a means to subvert the institutions of the present” (Lek). As proven by Afrofuturism, movements that upend hegemonic and colonial temporal frameworks are fundamental to reclaiming representational agency against the denial of coevalness. But in order to do so, they have to organically emerge from the periphery of Western time, rather than be conjured as part of **technoorientalist fantasies**. Instead, while the post-digital exotic pastiches of sinofuturism have circulated enough to consolidate into a recognizable aesthetic appropriated and subverted by local electronic musicians and new media artists, it is their less self-aware and more sensational variety that continues to find currency in popular representations of China. The introductory chapter of William A. Callahan’s China Dreams: 20 Visions of the future, aptly titled “China is the future,” offers a striking example of this banal brand of sinofuturism: It’s an exciting time to be Chinese. While in the West the first decade of the 21st century was defined by pessimism due to 9/11, the Iraq War, and the Great Recession, Chinese people are very optimistic that the 21st century will be the “Chinese century.” The fruits of China’s three decades of rapid economic growth are there for all to see: by 2010, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had the fastest computer in the world and the smartest students in the world, and it was enthusiastically entering the space age—just as the United States was retiring its fleet of Space Shuttles. (Callahan 1) This book’s first paragraph strings together many of the tropes highlighted above: national identity, the idea of a Chinese century, the PRC’s economic growth, and the post-reform developmental leapfrogging indexed by the trifecta of computational primacy, academic talent and space exploration, all measured against rusty yardsticks left over from the Cold War era. To sum up: sinofuturism responds to a lack of engagement with China’s future in both academic expertise and popular discussions of the country. It does so provocatively, by speculating on possible future configurations of wildly different aspects of Chinese history, culture and society, juxtaposing technological developments and traditional customs, global trends and local phenomena, political systems and material forces. At the same time, sinofuturism draws on— and at times **directly reproduces**—the tropes and narratives of techno-orientalism, reducing China to the last in a series of East Asian countries investing resources to accelerate industrialization and informatization and thus threatening the Western grip on technological innovation and transnational supply chains. The historical superimposition of techno-orientalism with popular culture genres like cyberpunk offers a convenient route for sinofuturism to find success as an aesthetic repertoire that is legible across contexts: outside China, it reacts with the mixture of fascination and anxiety for the illegibility and scale of China’s rise; inside China, it lends itself to the **self-orientalizing celebration** of national success. But this should not obfuscate its main operation. Sinofuturism, like techno-orientalism, operates as a **denial of coevalness.** In being largely articulated from the outside as an interpretive discourse, it posits some sort of equivalence between China and the future: China is the future, China comes from the future, the future will come from China, and so on. These proclaimations are as enticing as they are **sus**pect, for they deploy the future as a way of deferring participation in contemporariness. The future functions exactly as the past does in orientalist arguments: as a temporality through which otherness can be safely managed and problematic interactions steered away from. If the locus of Said’s orientalism was the Hejaz region, “a locale about which one can make statements regarding the past in exactly the same form (and with the same content) that one makes them regarding the present” (Said 235), the loci of sinofuturism are the skylines of Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Chongqing, ready to be inscribed with claims about the future. Sinofuturism is a **reverse orientalism**—an orientalism operating its denial of coevalness through the **attribution of futurity**